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In the summer of 2009 thousands of voices combined as Iranians, young and old, cried out in 
reaction to the presidential election from their rooftops—“Marg Bar Dictator” (death to the 
dictator) and “Allahu Akbar” (God is great).  In the weeks following President Ahmadinejad’s 
“victory”, voices from the rooftops of Tehran and other major Iranian cities reverberated with 
revolutionary phrases that had not been heard in almost thirty years. This widespread civil 
disobedience, along with the daily demonstrations taking place on the street, signaled the Iranian 
people’s challenge of the Islamic government.  
But after months of mass protests, why was there no political change after the 2009 
Iranian presidential election? Why did the demonstrations that had up to 3 million protestors stop 
while in 1979 similar dissent developed into a revolutionary movement? These questions will be 
addressed by comparing four significant variables common to both the 1979 Revolution and the 
2009 Green Movement; international pressure, internal pressure, strength of opposition, and 
governmental tactics used against the opposition. The analysis of these variables will illuminate 
the similarities and differences between 1979 and 2009 and examine under what conditions a 
political opposition movement could be successful in the Islamic Republic of Iran.  The simple 
fact that Iranians were yelling from the rooftops like they did 30 years ago against the Shah, 
demonstrates they have not forgotten about the Islamic Revolution of 1979.  And they have 
certainly not forgotten about the outcome—the capture of the political movement, which began 
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as a democratic process, by Islamic extremists. The Iranian people eager to rid themselves of an 
autocratic government, but realize true regime change takes time. Iranians today have learned the 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION  
On New Year’s Eve of 1977, Jimmy Carter visited Iran to demonstrate American support for 
Reza Shah Pahlavi’s regime. During his stay, he described Iran as “an island of stability in one of 
the most troubled areas of the world.”1 Only six months later, the first surges of the Islamic 
Revolution had begun and by January 1979, the Shah, the monarch of the “island of stability” 
had fled to Europe.  At this time, Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile to begin a 
revolutionary movement that would transform the political face of the Middle East.  
Similarly, just before the 2009 Iranian presidential elections there was also an atmosphere of 
political stability.  Supporters of all the presidential candidates were extremely passionate about 
the election and the issues involved in the campaign. Iran was filled with excitement and 
anticipation. The government proudly proclaimed that each person’s vote would count in the 
election while citizenry, especially the young, believed that change would occur within the 
governing system, reassured by the vast amount of political freedoms granted during the 
elections.  Public rallies, debates between candidates, and outspoken protestors on the streets 
emerged after more than a thirty year lapse.  Accordingly, the presidential election of 2009 had 
one of the highest voter turnouts in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Voters willingly 
stood in line for hours to be able to cast their vote; convinced that this time, the election would 
mean something. However, as soon as the government announced the election results, these 
sentiments rapidly changed.  
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When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory was announced on June 12th, Mir Hossein 
Mousavi’s supporters had an immediate reaction; the feelings of excitement and hope were 
transformed into sentiments of disappointment and anger. Immediately after the government 
released the results, people took to the streets in protest.  Each day the size of the demonstrations 
against the government continually increased. By the end of the first week of protests, 
demonstrators came into violent confrontation with the Iranian military. Peaceful protesters were 
beaten and killed in the streets, hundreds were arrested and charged with conspiracy, and 
suddenly, the newly “free” election atmosphere had been transformed into political and social 
upheaval. The Supreme Leader himself, Ali Khamenei, announced that any public protestors 
would be “going against the will of God” and would not be tolerated.  Despite the threat of 
imprisonment or death, intense protests continued in the streets of all major cities in Iran—
Tehran, Shiraz, Mashhad, Isfahan, and Tabriz.  
The protests that occurred in the aftermath of the presidential election had been deemed “The 
Green Revolution” by the global media. Although the movement is still alive today the intensity 
of the movement has decreased and it seems as though “stability” has returned to the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. Why did no political change occur? Why have the protests that had upwards of 
3 million supporters cease?  Why did the Green Revolution not become a revolution like the 
events of 1979?  I will attempt to answer these questions by comparing four significant variables 
common to the 1979 Revolution and the 2009 “Green Revolution”; international pressure, 
internal pressure, strength of opposition, and governmental tactics used against the opposition. 
The analysis of these variables will illuminate the similarities and differences between 1979 and 
2009 and examine under what conditions a political opposition movement could be successful in 
Iran today.  
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1.1 IRAN’S RULING HISTORY 
Until the beginning of the popular revolution in 1979, Iran was perpetually ruled by a monarchy.  
Iran’s last great empire had been established in 1501 by King Ismail of the Safavid dynasty who 
deemed Shiism the official state religion and united the territory that is now deemed Iran. The 
most famous king of this monarchy, Shah Abbas I, transformed the new Iranian capital, Esfahan, 
into one of the most beautiful and well built cities in the Middle East.  He also encouraged 
immense cultural growth and established trade with European cities. Eventually the Safavid rule 
declined and by the late eighteenth century the Turkish speaking Qajars took control. The Qajar 
period which occurred from 1794 to 1925, is regarded by scholars and the Iranian public alike as 
an age of political, economic, and social decline. The self proclaimed Qajar monarchs were 
unable to achieve fiscal or political stability.  Furthermore, corruption and incompetence were 
widespread because the Qajar monarchs received kickbacks from Western countries.  After years 
of frustration, protests finally broke out in 1905 and led to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. 
Iranians protesting high tariff prices forced the Qajar monarch to establish a constitution and a 
Majles, or Parliament. However, over the next ten years, the constitution was regularly 
suspended and re-established due to shifts in political power. Finally, after years of political 
frustrations, the leader of the Persian Cossack Brigade, Reza Khan Pahlavi, carried out a coup 
against the government in 1921. Over the next four years, he captured several powerful positions 
within the new Qajar government such as prime minister and war minister while slowly 
eliminating all the Qajar influence in Iran.  By 1926 he established his own monarchy, the 
Pahlavi dynasty, and changed his name to Reza Shah Pahlavi. 
Reza Shah Pahlavi greatly improved Iran’s social and economic infrastructure, creating 
the foundation for the modern day Iran.  However, he also ruled as an autocratic dictator, 
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constantly imposing political oppression. Reza Shah Pahlavi repeatedly clashed with his Western 
allies; he adamantly opposed the occupation of Iran by Russia and England during World War II 
and had extremely close ties to Germany.  Because of the Shah’s inability to cooperate with the 
Allied forces, British and Soviet troops invaded Iran in 1941 and forced him to abdicate the 
throne. His son, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, then became Shah and continued the Pahlavi dynasty. 
By the mid 1940s he quickly alienated pro-democratic Iranians by expanding his constitutional 
powers and by overriding decisions made by the Prime Minister and members of Parliament.  
After an assassination attempt in 1949, thought to be planned by the Communist Tudeh party, the 
Shah extended his powers even more. In addition to minimizing political freedoms, Reza 
Mohammad Shah was also more easily swayed by Western influence than his father. This added 
to the growing disapproval by the Iranian public and brought Prime Minister Muhammad 
Mossadegh to the forefront of Iranian politics in the early 1950s.  
Mossadegh, best known for his liberal and nationalistic ideology, began a campaign to 
eliminate Iran of all British control of oil—he disbanded the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Iran 
and nationalized the industry. Mossadegh, a promoter of democracy, encouraged hostility toward 
the Shah and acted as the catalyst that moved Iran into an age of modernization, mass political 
awareness, and political participation. His actions and policies encouraged political freedom; not 
only for the pro democratic parties, but for all beliefs in the political spectrum.  However, 
Mossadegh’s influence in Iranian politics ceased in 1953 with Operation Ajax—a CIA operation 
that overthrew him and put him under house arrest until his death in 1967. The Shah made sure 
his reforms would not continue by banning Mossadegh’s political party, and persecuting its 
prominent leaders.  
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Before the removal of Mossadegh, Iran had developed a more democratic political 
system, noted by a large increase in political participation.  But Mossadegh’s overthrow did not 
stop the pace of political development, but simply changed its course.  With the banning of 
opposition parties, political life migrated to the mosque; one of the only places the Shah could 
not punish citizens for expressing anti-monarch sentiment.  Therefore, instead of focusing on 
secular ideas, a large majority of the body politic continued its political development in the 
religious environment. Clerics then became the leading socializing force from the period of the 
overthrow of Mossadegh until the start of the Islamic Revolution in 1979.  Instead of moving 
toward democracy and secularization, many of the Iranian people turned to religiosity and 
theocratic ideals to fight the Shah’s despotic rule. No matter their political affiliation, Iranians, 
both elites and the body politic, were politically active in 1979 because it was an opportunity to 
build a new, democratic state. 
1.1.1 Post Islamic Revolution 
In the days immediately following the revolution of 1979 a diverse array of forces combined to 
fight for political power—students, communists, socialists, traditionalists, liberals and Islamists.  
Western and Iranian experts alike did not expect the outcome to be clerical rule (Brownlee 64). 
However, the Islamic groups within the revolution had the best mobilizing resources, 
overpowering the other prominent political ideologies.  
Accordingly, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Constitution was approved on October 4, 
1979 despite protest from secular politicians and strata of Iranian society. The new constitution 
was largely based on the principles outlined in Khomeini’s famous work, Islamic government 
(hukamnti Islami). In this work, Khomeini supported a very radical Islamic concept, the velayat-
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e-faqih, or the guardianship of the jurist on the basis that only a “mystically inspired jurist, who 
knew the sacred law” could lead the nation.2  The constitution created this position, the office of 
the jurist, which would be filled by the highest ranking Shia clergy and known simply as the 
Supreme Leader, or Rahbar.3 It also created the Council of Guardians, whose duties include 
enforcing Islamic law, interpreting the constitution, and overseeing all elections. The council was 
made up of six clerics and six laypeople; the non-cleric members are chosen by the Majles, or 
parliament, from candidates that need to be approved by the head of the judiciary.4 Finally, the 
constitution created a unicameral legislator, the Majles, and an elected President. 
 The Islamic Republic of Iran seemed to have some democratic institutions, but it was 
created to have little room for movement or opposition. All of the governing bodies and 
leadership positions were dependent upon each other. For example, the constitution described the 
President as the second-highest ranking official in the country.  In practice, however, presidential 
powers were circumscribed by the clerics, conservatives in Iran’s power structure, and by the 
authority of the Supreme Leader. It was the Supreme Leader, not the president, who controlled 
the armed forces and made decisions on security, defense, and major foreign policy issues. While 
the 290 members of the parliament, who were elected by popular vote every four years, had the 
power to introduce and pass laws, as well as to investigate and impeach cabinet ministers or the 
president, all Majles bills had to be officially approved by Guardian Council.5  
The relationship between the Supreme Leader, Council of Guardians, and the Assembly 
of Experts best exemplified Iran’s circular, closed system. The latter is responsible for 
overseeing the Supreme Leader’s actions and had the power to reappoint a new Rahbar if 
necessary. However, the Council of Guardians, appointed by the Supreme Leader, needed to 
approve all members of the Assembly of Experts. 6  Consequently, the Council of Guardians was 
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appointed directly by the Supreme Leader. Therefore, the body (Council of Guardians) that 
selected the institution (Assembly of Experts) that oversaw the most powerful government 
official in Iran (the Supreme Leader) was in fact, appointed by the Supreme Leader himself.  
After the ratification of the constitution, more conflict developed between political elites 
over the development of the Islamic state. Normally, during the beginning stages of regime 
formation, a ruling party could still develop if political elites could resolve their disagreements. 
A ruling party was essential to act as the mediator of disputes and enable the opportunity for 
solutions among rivals.7  But Iran never had this type of a ruling party—only a ruler, a Supreme 
Leader, Khomeini.  He acted as the only authority among rival elites and instead of negotiating 
he merely silenced all opposition. Khomeini “spent much energy and political capital to ensure 
that the opposing factions were kept in rough balance.”8  Instead of pursuing consensus within 
the regime, Khomeini’s leadership prevented the formation of a ruling political party and made 
sure that no one faction became too powerful. 
Most scholars agree that Iran’s post-revolutionary leaders were divided into three main 
factions—the traditionalist right, the modernist right, and the Islamic left.9 The traditionalist 
right was led by Khamenei and the founders of the Islamic Republican Party.  They were the 
most conservative and favored a clerical rule by a hierocracy of religious figures. They adhered 
to a strict interpretation of Islamic law and allowed, but did not fully support the popular election 
of offices such as the president and members of parliament. The modernist right grew from the 
traditionalist right, diverging their opinions on the political structure of the country, supporting 
more neo-liberal views.10 Led by Hashemi Rafsanjani, the modernist right’s goal was focused on 
enacting growth and economic prosperity.11 Lastly, the Islamic left believed deeply in popular 
sovereignty and attempted to include more of the public in the governing system. For example, 
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they proposed the popular election of members of the Majles. Although many in this group 
supported Khomeini as the Supreme Leader, their main focus was popular participation and 
concern for the masses.12 
While Khomeini was still alive, political tensions arose, but he was the mediator and final 
word on governing the country. Khomeini’s death in 1989 only solidified the party lines more 
deeply and large disagreements plagued the political elite. There was an opportunity for the 
country’s ruling clerics and political powers to create a more democratic and pluralist system for 
Iran, but the diverse ideologies split the leaders into factions with conflicting ideas of the state. 
At this time, elites including Khamenei, Rafsanjani, Montazeri, and Khatami came to the 
forefront of Iranian politics. 
1.1.2 Political Elite Conflict 
After the death of Khomeini, the new Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Rafsanjani 
became two of the post powerful leaders in the Islamic regime. Since the 1990s, Khamenei and 
Rafsanjani disagreed over domestic policy enforcement, foreign relations strategies, and other 
issues concerning the state.  But these disagreements escalated to new heights in summer 2009 
during the presidential campaign when Rafsanjani publicly criticized Khamenei.  He denounced 
the Supreme Leader for not stopping the “lies and insults” of Ahmadinejad, the most 
conservative presidential candidate. Ahmadinejad accused another candidate, Mir Hossein 
Mousavi of being “the puppet masters of lies” in Iran.  In response, Rafsanjani condemned 
Khamenei in a well-known Tehranian newspaper and said,  
“One expects your eminence, given your position, responsibility and personality, 
to take effective measures as you see fit to resolve this problem and eliminate 
  18 
dangerous plots….Put out the fire whose smoke is already visible and prevent its 
flames from rising and spreading through the elections and beyond…Without a 
doubt society and especially the youths need to be informed of the truth. This 
truth is seriously tied to the system’s credibility and the nation’s beliefs. I would 
not have written this letter had this been about the rights of a few 
individuals…many of our old companions in arms who either attained the lofty 
station of martyrdom or hastened to the remaining life are no longer with us. You 
(Khamenei), and myself and a small number of old companions and peers 
remain.”13 
This is just one example of the public disagreements that continued throughout the summer 
between members of the clerical elite. The significance of this criticism is that although 
Rafsanjani is the Chairman of the Assembly of Experts (the political institution that monitors/can 
dismiss the SL) and Chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council (unelected position in 
which the Council oversees legislative disagreements), he is still criticizing the Supreme Leader, 
the dominant authority in the Iranian political system.  The obvious outrage of Rafsanjani and his 
public cry of disapproval demonstrate the significance of elite quarreling in Iranian politics. If 
this type of denunciation is seen in the public sphere, there must be much more tension behind 
closed doors in holy city of Qom. 
The division of the Iranian political elites does not end with Khamenei and Rafsanjani. 
Once speculated as the successor to Khomeini, Ayatollah Montazeri, has been extremely vocal in 
his criticism with the current regime’s actions, especially those of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. 
Throughout his clerical life, Montazeri has been an opposition force to the Islamic regime.  He 
was demoted and stripped of his Grand Ayatollah title by Khomeini himself for criticizing the 
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Supreme Leader’s decision to support the killing of author Salman Rushdie and for endorsing 
protests against Khomeini’s fatwa on the issue.14  Montazeri is also very well known for his 
disdain of the government’s treatment of Bahai’s in Iran. Not surprisingly, by the middle of June 
2009, Montazeri had already repeatedly expressed his doubts about the results of the presidential 
elections.  He even denounced the Iranian regime for no longer acting in accordance with the 
laws of Islam. Furthermore, once brutal violence began in Iran in June 2009, Montazeri was even 
more outraged, criticizing the government for attacking its own people. In a public letter to the 
moderate cleric, Dr. Mohsen Kadivar, he points out the inconsistencies of the regime and 
encourages the Iranian masses to express themselves, saying: 
“As I said, those who have lost, religiously and reasonably, the credibility for 
serving the public, are automatically dismissed, and the continuation of their work 
has no legitimacy. If they want to use force, or fool or cheat people in order to 
keep their power, people must express their opinion about the illegitimacy and 
lack of their approval of their performance, and seek their dismissal through the 
best and least harmful way. It is clear that this [dismissal of the officials] is a 
societal duty of everyone….”15 
It would seem that with clerics such as Montazeri and Rafsanjani opposing the 
established rule in Iran, there would be more clerical (and of course secular) elite support for 
reform. However, even though there is a large divide between the clerical and secular elites in 
Iran, lack of information regarding leadership complicates understanding elite dynamics. Besides 
the famous political players such as Khamenei, Rafsanjani, Montazeri, Ahmadinejad, Khatami, 
and the like, it is very hard to pinpoint other Iranian political elites and their government 
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positions. Furthermore, it is difficult to obtain accurate information from the Iranian government. 
The majority of clerical debates take place in the holy city of Qom or in secret meetings. 
Because of the mass protests against the election of 2009, more Iranian government 
officials appeared in the public sphere address the social tension; to prevent an all out revolution. 
Many of these governmental figures are being held responsible for the atrocities committed 
during the 2009 demonstrations. These men are the most fervent supporters of Khamenei and the 
theocratic Islamic Republic of Iran. For example, Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the Supreme Leader 
and rumored possible successor, reportedly took direct control of armed militias during the post-
election protests. The result was the killing of hundreds of peaceful demonstrators. Another 
political figure, Hassan Taeb, is commander of the paramilitary Basij force. He was accused of 
sanctioning and then covering up the rape and torture of demonstrators in Iran’s prisons in June 
and July of 2009.  Furthermore, Tehran’s chief prosecutor, Saeed Mortazavi, was in charge of 
interrogating political prisoners arrested during the demonstrations in Tehran. Under his 
authority photojournalist Zahra Kazemi was tortured, brutally beaten, and then killed. Lastly, 
Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani is currently commander of the Supreme Leader’s military 
unit, the Quds Force. According to a number of Iranian news sources, he was one of the advisors 
who suggested to Khamenei that he should use violent force against protestors in the streets. All 
of these men stand by Khamenei’s side and are in direct opposition to the views of reformers 
such as Rafsanjani, Khatami, and the 2009 presidential candidates Mahdi Karubi and Mousavi.16 
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1.2 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2009 
After months of screening almost 500 candidates,17 the Guardian Council finally choose four 
presidential candidates on May 20th, 2009—Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mehdi Karrubi, Mohsen 
Rezai, and Mir-Hossein Mousavi. Ahmadinejad, an ultra conservative, ran on a platform of 
fighting poverty and corruption and emphasized his intent to share Iranian oil profits with the 
people. Accordingly, he had the backing of the Supreme Leader, the military, and most 
conservative Iranians. Karrubi, former Speaker of the Parliament and the only clerical candidate, 
was a reformer who encouraged compromise between conservative and reformist factions in 
order to achieve social, political and economical improvement in Iran. He was also the only 
candidate who openly criticized Ahmadinejad for his comments regarding the Holocaust and the 
destruction of Israel. Mohsen Rezai, former commander of the Revolutionary Guard during the 
Iraq-Iran war, was the only other conservative candidate. A PhD in Economics, Rezai’s platform 
focused on fiscal reforms and stressed the reduction of inflation, poverty, and unemployment. 
The last candidate, Mousavi, was best known for his position as Prime Minister from 1981-1989. 
A strong reformist, he called for the expansion of personal freedoms and the elimination of 
restrictions on political rights such as freedom of speech. 
Normally during election campaigns in Iran, political and social restrictions had been 
relaxed, and in the summer of 2009 Iranians took full advantage of this opportunity and were 
even more engaged than usual. Support for candidates was shown in public rallies all over the 
country, especially on university campuses. Furthermore, this was the most expensive 
presidential campaign in Iran’s history—Ahmadinejad and Mousavi spent almost ten million 
dollars each to sway voters.18 The election was also the first in which public debates between 
candidates were broadcast on Iranian television. A week before the election, there were six 
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debates in total; each consisting of two candidates facing each other once. The debate between 
Mousavi and Ahmadinejad was extremely heated—Mousavi criticized Ahmadinejad’s foreign 
policy and his denial of the Holocaust while Ahmadinejad accused Mousavi of being supported 
by corrupt clerics who were living an un-Islamic lifestyle. The debate became personal when the 
incumbent accused Mousavi’s wife, Zahra, of lying about her education credentials. The 
comment angered Mousavi supporters and encouraged Zahra Mousavi to get more involved in 
the campaign, especially lobbying for women’s rights. Consequently, the debates sparked 
discussion among the Iranian public and intensified the campaign. According to Iranian media, at 
least 40 to 50 million people watched the debates each night.19  
Just days before the election, support for Mousavi soared and a public rally was held in 
Iran’s international stadium. The stadium was full of his supporters, young and old, wearing 
green to represent their support for his platform.  Additionally, the day before the election 
thousands of his supporters had formed a “human chain” on one of the main streets in Tehran to 
demonstrate their support and hope for the future. Mousavi’s reformist ideas included 
encouraging more dialogue with the West, increasing transparency in the government, 
supporting the increase in women’s rights, and pushing for more social and political freedom 
really resonated with young Iranians. Excitement escalated when a few independent Iranian polls 
showed support for Ahmadinejad dwindling, especially in rural areas. Therefore, most Iranians 
expected a close race.  In fact, observers predicted the elections would force a run-off between 
Ahmadinejad and Mousavi. 
On the day of the election, approximately 40 million ballots were cast—the largest voter 
turnout in Iranian history. After the closing of polls on June 12th, 2009, the Interior Minister 
announced that Ahmadinejad had won with 62% percent of the vote. The next day, Sunday, June 
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13th, unrest was already developing. There were small demonstrations in the capital and other 
major cities and a feeling of anticipation and unease overtook the country. By Monday, June 
14th, hundreds of thousands of Mousavi supporters took to the streets in the largest rally since the 
beginning of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  Furthermore, witnesses stated the next day’s 
demonstration was even larger than the previous, adding to the momentum of the movement.  A 
counter demonstration in support of Ahmadinejad was held at Vali Asr Square in Tehran, but 
observers say it was much smaller than the Green Movement’s protest.  The highest estimate of 
attendance at the Ahmadinejad rally is estimated to be around 10,000 people.  Furthermore, there 
had also been accusations that the television coverage was distorted to create the illusion of a 
larger mass of people.  
After the Ahmadinejad rally, anti-government protests grew rapidly and the initially 
peaceful demonstrations became increasingly more intense. Every day, more people took the 
streets yelling phrases like “where is my vote?”, “death to the dictator”, and “down with the 
dictator [Ahmadinejad]”. The people’s ardent opposition caught the attention of the government 
and more police emerged at the demonstrations. Yet Mousavi still urged peaceful demonstrations 
and made it clear that violence was not to be used.  However, by the third day of protests, June 
15th, there had already been reports of deaths on the streets of Tehran.  
On June 19th, during his Friday prayer sermon, Supreme Leader Khamenei declared that 
the government would use force to protect the Islamic Republic and prevent further 
demonstrations. He emphasized his support for the reelected President, encouraged the 
opposition to take peaceful action, and finally blamed “foreign” enemies for causing problems in 
Iran’s internal affairs. After the protests continued, the Iranian Basij and Revolutionary Guard 
forces began to use tear gas, batons, and even guns to control crowds on June 20th.  At this time 
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ten deaths were recorded by the Iranian government, bringing the total to at least 17.20  However, 
the overwhelming number of clashes between protestors and military forces in almost all of 
Iran’s major cities led many to believe that deaths were more widespread than reported. This 
same day the Guardian Council convened to discuss the election results with all of the 
presidential candidates. All were present except Mousavi, who allegedly refused to attend the 
meeting unless the idea of a new election was on the agenda. The next day, June 21st, members 
of Mousavi’s campaign were arrested along with Rafsanjani family members, a clear sign that 
the government considered both of the reformers a threat. On June 22nd, the Guardian Council 
admitted that there had been some “irregularities” in the voting process, but claimed none would 
have affected the elections results.  
Over the next week, despite government violence against the demonstrators, protests 
continued to intensify. Not surprisingly, Khamenei and other prominent clerics such as senior 
cleric Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, continued to accuse Western powers such as Great Britain and 
the United States of foreign interference in Iran’s domestic affairs.  Accordingly, nine British 
Embassy staff members were taken into custody on June 28th for allegedly “inflaming post-
election tensions in Iran.”21 Eventually, eight of the nine members were released but the 
government still blamed the West, in hopes of distracting Iranians from the violent protests 
inside Iran. Although two of the four candidates, Mousavi and Karrubi, still contested the 
validity of the election, the Guardian Council officially confirmed the results were accurate on 
June 29th. Their decision was made after a random recount was done on 10% of the total votes. 
Khatami, Mousavi, and Karrubi all called for the hiring of an independent organization to 
arbitrate the election disputes, but the government refused.  Demonstrations continued, and on 
July 1st the Iranian government estimated that 27 were killed and 627 arrested since the start of 
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the protests on June13th; however, human rights organizations believe the numbers to be 
significantly higher. For instance, just 10 days later Iran’s prosecutor general admitted that over 
2500 people had been detained in Tehran alone.22 
Although protests continued into July and August, they were much smaller. The Green 
Movement was not powerful enough to challenge the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij. 
Furthermore, Khamenei and his military apparatus were willing and determined to sustain the 
election outcome by force—the stability of the regime depended on it. Even though in the short-
term no political change was accomplished, the movement created many long term possibilities 
for the Iranian state and society. Primarily, the election disputes created even more tension 
between the members of the political elite. In fact, in the holy city, Qom, clerical factions were 
torn over the issue. One of the most influential clerical groups, the Society of Scholars of Qom 
Seminary, happily accepted Ahmadinejad’s victory. However, another group, the Association of 
Researchers and Teachers at Qom Seminary, disagreed with the decision of the Guardian 
Council and went so far as to encourage the government to arrest and punish its own officials for 
the “beating, death, and damage” that occurred post election.23  Although Iran did not experience 
any drastic political change, it now has a growing social movement, a faction of society that is 
willing to openly support reform. Although the “Green Revolution” did not see immediate 
results, it is still developing underground in Iran today. 
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2.0  COMPARISON—1979 AND 2009 
How did the Iran of 1979, a political system with a wealthy middle class, powerful Western 
international allies, a repressive dictator, and large military force fall prey to an Islamic 
Revolution while the Iran of 2009, a oppressive theocracy with a growing lower class, no 
Western allies, an autocratic clerical elite, and a military comparable to the Shah’s was able to 
repress the opposition with relative ease?  Before exploring comparisons between the two events, 
it is necessary to first answer the question, why did the Islamic Revolution occur? While there 
are different scholarly views, many academics agree that the Islamic Revolution was the 
outcome of ideological and political processes that had starting evolving as early as the 1950s. 
For example, Hamid Dabashi, Professor of Iranian Studies and Comparative Literature at 
Columbia University, asserts in Theology of Discontent that Islamists had been long prepared for 
a religious revolution by the relentless political attacks they had suffered from the Shah. He had 
forced them to practice in the private sphere and it was here that religious clerics set their Islamic 
agenda, far away from the observation of the Shah’s government. Within mosques and hawzehs 
(Shi’i religious seminaries), they recruited, preached, and mobilized their followers so that they 
would be ready when the time was right to oppose the Shah. Others like Stephen Kinzer, a 
foreign correspondent, trace the roots of the revolution back to the 1953 overthrow of Prime 
Minister Mossadegh.  In All the Shah’s Men, Kinzer argues that if the coup had not occurred, 
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there may not have been an Islamic Revolution. If Mossadegh was not replaced, Iran could have 
developed into a mature democracy. 
 Other Middle Eastern specialists like Fred Halliday, Nikki Keddie, and Mohsen Milani 
attribute the Shah’s fall to socioeconomic development, specifically the inequality in Iranian 
society at the time.  In The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Milani assesses the role of Iran’s 
social groups and coalitions, such as the bazaaris (bazaar merchants and shopkeepers), the 
intelligentsia, the Shi’i clerics, and the middle class, in facilitating the rise of the clerical elite to 
power.  Milani also states that the overthrow of Mossadegh in 1953 had a large impact on the 
formation of the 1979 Islamic Revolution; it created a platform for diverse political groups to 
organize against the Shah.  Finally, other academics like Ervand Abrahamian, Professor of 
History at City University of New York, emphasize Khomeini’s role in the revolutionary 
process. While in exile and even after he returned to Iran in February of 1979, he constantly 
criticized the Shah’s actions, promoted an Islamic government, and incited students with anti-
Western sentiments.  Abrahamian argues that without Khomeini’s hundreds of interviews, 
sermons, interviews and political announcements between 1962 and 1989, the revolution would 
have never developed or been able to be maintained.24 
Although all these scholars stress different elements, there is one common link—they all 
agree that the Pahlavi monarch was regarded as a creature of the United States and the United 
Kingdom—and therefore was seen as illegitimate. All of the opposition groups, whether 
religious or otherwise, recognized the Shah’s illegitimate rule and joined together to overthrow 
his government. Even though the theocratic regime established was not an ideal form of 
government for most of the Iranian population, it was at least free from foreign influence.  
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3.0  THE FIRST VARIABLE—THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM’S RESPONSE 
3.1 1979 
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 was a shock to the world. No one, not even close Western allies 
of the Shah, expected any threats to his reign. With this in mind, there was no international 
pressure for a revolution against the regime from the West; in fact, because the Shah was their 
ally, American and European powers did not want him to be overthrown.  The Shah had so easily 
suppressed Khomeini in the 1963 uprising that international actors did not see the possibility of a 
revolution developing.  They viewed the Pahlavi monarch as a stable regime and only supported 
the new governmental coalition when it was clear the Shah was exiled from Iran permanently. 
However, some academics such as Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi argue that the 
weakening of the relationship between Iran and its international supporters, mainly the United 
States, could have made Iran more susceptible to a revolutionary movement. But the evidence for 
this idea is insufficient.  Although the US and UK did not militarily support the Shah, they 
always spoke out diplomatically in favor of his rule. Up until the Shah left Iran in January of 
1979, his international allies stood behind him; for instance, in October of 1978, only three 
months before the revolution, American Ambassador William Sullivan reiterated U.S. backing of 
the Shah by saying, “…our destiny is to work with the Shah.”25  When opposition protests 
began, the U.S. and the UK continued their unwavering support. National Security Advisor, 
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Zbigniew Brzezinski, advised the Shah to stand firmly against the Iranian opposition. Even when 
the Shah’s military killed unarmed protestors in the streets, President Carter phoned from Camp 
David to demonstrate his continuing support.26 And finally, even after the Shah was deposed, 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger welcomed the Shah into the U.S. for medical care, despite 
warnings from the new Iranian government and the State Department that the action would hurt 
American relations with the new Iranian government. He believed the U.S. “should offer refuge 
to a man who had once been a loyal friend.”27  Although the Carter Administration tried to form 
a relationship with the new de facto government of Iran, by the end of the hostage crisis in 
January 1981, all diplomat ties were cut between Iran and the United States. 
Other international actors at this time, such as the USSR, did not have major effects on 
the politics inside Iran. The USSR and Iran had a hostile relationship since the second half of the 
18th century when British colonialism expanded into India.  The USSR consistently saw Iran’s 
geographical position as a strategic stronghold from where they could control the region. This 
rivalry continued into the Pahlvi era when by the West’s influence, the Shah took a strong anti-
communist position. The USSR supported the communist party in Iran, the Tudeh Party, even 
when the monarch banned the party. In fact, in 1978 the USSR welcomed the overthrow of the 
Shah. It actually referred to a 1921 treaty to deter any US intervention to help the Shah and even 
defended the new Islamic regime against US criticism. However, the theocracy eventually 
banned the Tudeh party again, despite disagreement from the USSR. 
Accordingly, the strong backing of the Shah by the US and UK acted as a motivator for 
the religious opposition movement. The ulama, the religious community, knew it had no Western 
allies outside of Iran. The Iranian regime led by the Shah was a creature created by the American 
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and British governments.  If the Islamists were going to enact change, they would have to do it 
themselves and from within the country. 
3.2 2009 
With the 2009 protests, however, the situation was completely different. Iran’s relationship with 
the West had never recovered from the tension produced by the Islamic Revolution and 
negotiations over nuclear weapons between the U.S. and Iran.  When the subsequent 
demonstrations against the government began in June, Western countries proclaimed their verbal 
support of the Iranian people. American and European leaders encouraged Iranians to demand 
democratic rights such as fair and free elections; support was behind the opposition movement in 
this case.  However, because the international pressure was not tangible, nothing came of it. The 
US or the EU did not provide any military aid, just verbal support.  Green Movement members 
knew the Western powers were on their side, but were receiving no help in the cause. They were 
empowered knowing they had the backing of Western pro-democratic forces, but intangible 
support did nothing to progress the freedoms they were demanding.  Additionally, Western 
actors did not present a united front—which would have helped the opposition—each country 
reacted differently. 
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3.2.1 The American Response 
The United States was one of the last Western countries to comment on aftermath of the Iranian 
elections; many claim the late reaction was due to Obama’s concern that support for the 
opposition would affect nuclear weapons negotiations with Iran.  The US President’s first official 
response was on June 15th when he stated he had “deep concern about the elections”, but ruled 
out any direct involvement on the grounds that it would not be “productive, due to the history of 
U.S.-Iran relations”. Furthermore, he called on the Iranian leaders to “respect the democratic 
process”, a pro forma statement. The Iranian people were protesting the election results for 
exactly this reason—the Islamic Republic had no democratic processes or institutions.  He also 
told White House reporters that same day that how Iran goes about electing its leaders, “is 
something ultimately for the Iranian people to decide.”28 But the Iranian people had already 
decided—they wanted free and fair elections. Although most Iranians did not want direct 
military involvement from the U.S., they hoped for a stronger stance against the regime’s violent 
actions.  Iranians on social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter demonstrated these 
sentiments by commenting repeatedly with statements such as, “We need people around the 
world to help to raise the issues, put pressure on the Iranian government.”29 
Obama’s strategy was extremely generalized; to verbally support the Iranian protestors 
while not completely alienating the Iranian leadership for fear of its effect on American national 
security interests. He did not want to be seen as meddling in Iran’s domestic affairs and risk a 
future chance at negotiations with Iran about its nuclear program.  However, the Iranian 
government would have accused the U.S. of involvement in the election process with or without 
comments from Obama. For instance, the headline of Kayhan News, a major Iranian paper, read 
“400 Million Dollar CIA Budget for Creating Riots after the Election”, only a few days after the 
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protests began.30  Furthermore, even before the President made any statement about the election, 
Supreme Leader Khamenei deemed the United States as an “interventionist” force in the 
aftermath of the presidential elections, claiming that the U.S. was trying to incite opposition 
movements.  
Many Iranians saw Obama’s acceptance of the Ahmadinejad’s presidency, especially 
without significant changes in Iran’s political conditions, as a betrayal of the protestors’ 
objectives.  When Obama failed to condemn the Iranian government for its use of violence, some 
Iranians saw this as a green light for Khamenei and the military to use force to break up the 
demonstrations.31  Even American officials in the Obama administration, such as Vice-President 
Joe Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, also remarked they would have liked to see the 
President take a firmer stance on supporting the demonstrators in Iran.32  The American 
President was also subject to criticism for his comment made on June 17th:  
“It’s important to understand that although there is some ferment taking place in 
Iran, that the difference between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi in terms of their 
actual policies may not be as great as has been advertised.  Either way the United 
States is going to be dealing with an Iranian regime that has historically been 
hostile to the United States, that has caused some problems in the neighborhood 
and is pursuing nuclear weapons.”33 
Many regarded this comment as undermining Mousavi’s cause. Members of the Iranian 
opposition thought the comment implied that no matter the outcome of the situation, Iran will 
still be seen as a nuclear threat, and nothing else. The struggle for democracy was of no 
importance. An Iranian expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Karim 
Sadjadpour called the statement an “egregious error”.  The Iranian people were risking their own 
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lives because they wanted a significant political change; the American message to them 
shouldn’t have been that it didn’t make a difference to the United States what happened.  
Furthermore, Obama’s comments were a huge disappointment to pro-democratic 
Iranians, specifically the younger population. During the U.S. presidential elections of 2008, they 
had been encouraged by Obama’s promise to engage Iran and to promote democracy. After 
human rights violations were committed by the government against the Iranian people in the 
aftermath of the elections, they expected more direct support from his administration. However, 
there was none. In fact, young Iranians were even more angered when it was revealed that 
Obama corresponded with Khamenei while post election protests were still continuing, but only 
discussed nuclear program negotiations.34  In one of the Green Movement protests in the fall of 
2009 protesters against the regime shouted, “Obama, you are either with us—or with them”35 
Accordingly to Iranians, Obama’s previous vow to engage in “aggressive personal diplomacy” 
fell short and it seemed like he was “with them”.  
Many have concluded that the United States had not put enough pressure on Iran during 
the aftermath of the elections when violence was used on the Iranian people, and the Obama 
administration should have taken a stronger stance in opposing the election fraud and violence. 
In fact, more negotiation attempts and tools like economic sanctions were used against Iran for 
pursuing its nuclear program than for its killing of thousands of innocent people demonstrating 
for a free and fair election process. 
3.2.2 The European Response 
The European response to the Iranian elections was very different—although most EU leaders 
did recognize the need to continue to negotiate with Iran over its nuclear program, they were 
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much more vigorous and outspoken in opposing Ahmadinejad’s reelection and the violence that 
followed.  For instance, on June 22nd Franco Frattini, the Italian foreign minister deemed the 
violence against the protesters and the deaths that followed as “unacceptable” in the eyes of the 
international community.  Similarly, the Czech Foreign Ministry expressed "revulsion at the 
documented police violence against peaceful protesters" and urged that other EU members send 
this message to all Iranian diplomats.36  In the same week, the German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel strongly criticized the arrests of Iranian citizens and the ouster of foreign media from 
Iran. She also called for an investigation into the election fraud and for the immediate release of 
arrested opposition members. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President 
Nicholas Sarkozy condemned the election as fraudulent and the subsequent violence. On July 3rd, 
Sarkozy backed the UK’s call for united and strong EU action by saying, “a strong response is 
required so that Iranian leaders will really understand that the path that they have chosen will be 
a dead end.”37  Finally, Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, criticized 
Iran’s actions in the aftermath of the protest, specifically the expulsion of foreign media. 
Unlike the U.S. President, European leaders also threatened Iran with direct action. For 
example, Italy’s foreign minister threatened to rescind Iran’s invitation to the G-8 talks if the 
violence continued.  Italy’s foreign ministry spokesman also announced that Italy instructed its 
embassy to provide “humanitarian aid” to any wounded protesters in Iran.38  Additionally, EU 
foreign ministers declared, “the EU is determined to pursue these issues and to act with a view to 
put an end to this unacceptable situation” referring to the government restricting all types of 
communication between Iranians during and after the presidential election. Accordingly, the EU 
did call on Iranian officials to stop censorship and went so far as to stop exports of electronic 
  35 
devices that could be used to disturb the internet connection or to intercept private 
conversations.39  
3.2.3 Non Western Response 
While Western leaders condemned the Iranian government for its use of violence, Russian 
leaders did not have the same reaction. On June 16th, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov 
Moscow expressed “serious concern" about the violence used against Iranian protestors. 
However, he also said, "At the same time, we will not interfere in Iran's internal affairs. Our 
position is that all issues that have emerged in the context of the elections will be sorted out in 
line with democratic procedures."40  Russia was also the only member of the G8 that refused to 
condemn Iran in the aftermath of the election. The Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, sent 
congratulations to Ahmadinejad on his reelection and even expressed hope that relations between 
Iran and Russia would expand for the benefit of both the countries. In fact, Ahmadinejad’s first 
official business as newly elected president was a visit to Russia where he attended a conference 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, of which Iran is an observer. The Russian 
government openly welcomed him to the country without reservation despite the turmoil in 
Iran.41 Besides Russia, the presidents of Turkey, China, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Venezuela also 
all congratulated Ahmadinejad on his victory.  Members of the Green Movement were very 
hostile toward these countries, specifically Russia and China for their close ties with the Islamic 
government.  
Both Russia and China support the hard line Iranian regime, not only in the diplomatic 
sense but also through commercial trade and military spending. For instance, Russia has not only 
publicly backed Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program, but has also provided most of the 
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materials and technical guidance of its existing nuclear plants . China, on the other hand, imports 
over 700,000 barrels of Iranian oil a day and the Iranian Ministry of Oil recently announced that 
China plans to invest 40 billion dollars into Iran’s oil refining industry. Some sources report that 
Iran has moved much of its foreign currency reserve from European banks to Chinese banks.42 
Many Green Movement members believe that Russia and China’s unwavering support prevents 
regime change because the Islamic Republic is financially dependent on these two countries.  
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4.0  SECOND VARIABLE—INTERNAL PRESSURE 
The vast internal response from the Iranian people in both 1979 and 2009 reflected the Iranian 
people’s discontent with the governments’, specifically in two areas—political and economic 
grievances.  
4.1 POLITICAL GRIEVANCES—THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 
While some scholars trace the roots of the Islamic Revolution to the 1950s, dissatisfaction with 
the Pahlavi dynasty occurred much earlier during the reign of Reza Shah from 1925-1941. 
Political life was extremely limited during his rule because of the Shah’s persecution of 
opposition forces and tyrannical controls over the government. All types of opponents, including 
poets and writers, religious clerics, and even secular politicians were suppressed.43 More 
importantly, the monarchy had no roots in tradition. The Pahlavi dynasty was only established 
because clerics and feudal lords refused to accept the idea of a republic.  
Despite his faults, Reza Shah created modern day Iran by introducing vast political and 
economic modernization policies. During his reign, he created the modern public health system, 
improved Iran’s infrastructure by building highways and a railroad system, and founded the 
University of Tehran.  But public attitudes during his rule were ambivalent—he changed the 
traditional tribal order of the country; a positive to some Iranians who wanted a more modern 
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state, but also disappointing to those who held on to tradition. His rapid modernization policies, 
coupled with his autocratic rule often angered different factions of society. For example, one 
modernization reform, the Shah’s decree that encouraged women to discard the traditional 
Islamic covering angered religious clerics in the city of Mashhad and created a strong religious 
opposition, deeming Reza Shah’s policies anti-Islamic. Besides clerics, members of the new 
intelligentsia, specifically young academics who had studied abroad, were also against the Shah. 
Under his reign, the Majles complied with all royal decrees, political opposition was persecuted, 
and dissenting opinions were not tolerated. These same frustrations would carry over to the reign 
of Reza Shah’s son, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, when he came to power in 1941.   
As Ervand Abrahamian puts it, “The 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran destroyed Reza 
Shah—but not the Pahlavi state…the Allies… realized that the Iranian state could be useful in 
achieving certain goals…”44  Muhammad Reza Shah’s reign was defined by the way he came 
into power.  From 1941 until his overthrow in 1979, many viewed him as a puppet of the United 
States and Britain; a figurehead by which the West could protect its interests in the Middle East, 
especially regarding oil.  While this was the main source of the Shah’s lack of political 
legitimacy; three main political events—Mossadegh’s overthrow in 1953, the 1963 uprisings and 
the resulting exile of Khomeini, and the vast political oppression and violence the Shah imposed 
on opposition in the late 1970s—undermined support for his rule and led to the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979. 
4.1.1 Mossedegh’s Overthrow 
For the first two years of Muhammad Reza Shah’s regime, the Majles remained the same 
because of Allied encouragement. Then, between 1943 and 1945 political activity blossomed and 
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several small parties emerged. These parties included the National Will party, the Communist, 
Tudeh party, and the Nationalist Front led by Mohammad Mossadegh. Consequently, during this 
time period the nationalization of oil became a dominate issue in mainstream Iranian politics. It 
is crucial to understand Iran’s attempt to nationalize the oil industry, since it is the root of the 
1953 overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh. 
As early as 1949, the public expressed its disapproval of the Shah. After an assassination 
attempt in Feb 1949, instead of support, street demonstrations against the Shah emerged. While 
celebrating the founding of Tehran University the Shah was shot by a man thought to be 
affiliated with the Tudeh Party; however, it was later rumored that he was an Islamic 
fundamentalist.45  The Shah’s popularity continued to wane and the 1950 Majles elections were 
dominated by the National Front, Mossadegh’s Party, one of the most powerful and anti-
monarchial groups in Iranian politics at the time. The National Front’s main platform was 
economic freedom from the British owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.  
After the Shah appointed Ali Razmara, a military leader sympathetic to British oil 
interests, the new Prime Minister in June of 1950 political tensions in the country intensified. 
Mossadegh gathered middle and lower class support for nationalizing the oil industry. Petitions 
and passionate street demonstrations followed. In the meantime, the Tudeh party also 
championed Mossadegh’s oil cause.  This issue escalated and on March 7th, 1951 Ali Ramzara 
was assassinated by a member of Fadayan-e Islam, a militant Islamic group; most likely because 
of his secular, pro-British policies.46  Then, in mid March, a Majles committee recommended the 
nationalization of the Iranian oil industry. The Tudeh Party reacted by leading a general strike in 
the oil industry in early April.  With this help, by April 28th   the bill was approved and 
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reluctantly signed by the Shah. By May of 1951 Mossadegh was named the Prime Minister, 
replacing the Shah’s choice.  
During Mossadegh’s time as Prime Minister, the Iranian Oil Company was created and 
democratic institutions and processes developed rapidly; mostly because Mossadegh’s regime 
forced the Shah to reign instead of rule.  Mossadegh was always trying to find a way to limit the 
Shah’s constitutional powers.  However, this took a backseat toward the end of 1951 when the 
British government refused to support the Iranian Oil Company and blocked all exportation of 
Iranian oil.  In response, Mossadegh traveled to the United States and lodged a formal complaint 
against the British to the United Nations Security Council.  While there, he also negotiated with 
the American administration for financial aid, requesting a loan from the Truman 
Administration. But the American government refused to accept any of Mossadegh’s requests 
and the British retaliated against Iran by freezing all of its assets. 47 
 Mossadegh struggled to balance his commitment the nationalization of oil, which called 
for a focus on foreign policy, and his promise to the Iranian people for domestic reforms. 
Economic difficulties created by the British boycotts and internal disagreements among 
prominent National Front members only worsened the situation. Despite these struggles, 
Mossadegh was named Time’s Man of the Year in 1951. The article described him as “…the 
most noteworthy figure on the world scene” and deemed him the “Iranian George 
Washington.”48 Even though Mossadegh was struggling to make tangible progress, his 
commitment to rid Iran of foreign control was well known internationally.  
The conflict between the Shah and Mossadegh came to a climax in mid 1952. As allies of 
the British, the Shah and his loyal supporters wanted Mossadegh replaced. Therefore, in July 
1952 the Shah dismissed Mossadegh as Prime Minister after he had insisted on the constitutional 
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right to appoint the Minister of War and the Chief of Staff of his new administration (Keddie 
126).  Mass protests emerged and lasted for five days, even though the Shah dispatched the 
military to end the resistance. Over 250 Iranians were killed during the demonstrations and the 
Shah was forced to reinstate Mossadegh. This event, deemed the Siyeh-e-Tir (the 13th of the 
month of Tir on the Iranian calendar), demonstrated that despite Iran’s economic struggles, the 
Iranian people still backed Mossadegh’s political agenda.49  
Mossadegh was initially able to forestall the coup against him. On August 16th, 1953 
Colonel Nassiri of the Imperial Guard planned to present the Prime Minister with a royal order 
demanding his resignation and replacing him with General Zahedi. But the Chief of the Iranian 
army tipped off Mossadegh’s regime, and with the help of the Tudeh Party, prevented the coup. 
Mossadegh then announced via a radio broadcast that Colonel Nassiri had been arrested and that 
the Shah, American, and British forces were behind the failed coup. The Shah immediately fled 
to Baghdad and anti-monarchical riots spread throughout Iran’s major cities.50  
While trying to control violence on the streets, Mossadegh alienated his own supporters 
and specifically angered his former ally, the Tudeh party. He began to lose support of various 
allies and only two days later, protests against Mossedegh began.  Furthermore, Mossadegh no 
longer had support of the religious ulama. Prominent clerical leaders, such as Ayatollah Sayyed 
Abul-Qassem Kashani, fully supported Mossadegh in the summer of 1952, but in 1953 helped 
organize his downfall.  Mossadegh provided former religious supporters a secular alternative, 
taking away the religious base.51  The main advocates of Operation Ajax, the plan to overthrow 
the Prime Minister, were the United States and the British, along with a few disgruntled royal 
military officers. However, internal dissatisfaction from the Iranian population was necessary for 
the coup to be fully executed.  
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Without the support of the Tudeh Party and the religious elite, it was much easier for 
General Zahedi to capture Mossadegh. On August 18th, as protests on the street continued, 
Zahedi surrounded the Prime Minister’s private home with military tanks. After a nine hour 
struggle, Mossadegh was finally arrested. The army and Zahedi took temporary control of the 
country until the Shah returned on August 22.52  Eight other high ranking officers who supported 
Mossadegh were also arrested and served a minimum of a five year prison sentence. Mossadegh 
was tried by a military court shortly after the Shah’s return and received three years in prison; 
then he was on house arrest until his death in 1967.53 
Most Iranian specialists agree that the 1953 coup changed Iranian political development 
and eventually led to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. For instance, Professor Mohsen Milani and 
Nikki Keddie identify a number of ways the political and social developed was affected.  First, 
the United States replaced Great Britain as the dominant power in Iran and the Shah was forever 
deemed as a creature of the U.S.—resulting in the Shah’s total loss of legitimacy. Second, 
American participation in Operation Ajax and its support of the Shah, limited the possibility of 
internal democratic reforms. With the knowledge of the West’s unwavering backing, 
Muhammad Reza Shah was able to engage in oppressive and tyrannical acts against his own 
people. Third, to prevent further opposition, the Shah created the internal secret police, SAVAK. 
This action was a direct result of Mossadegh’s rise to power. SAVAK protected the monarchy, to 
infiltrated the opposition groups, and to enforced the Shah’s mandates; it eventually became one 
of the most powerful and dangerous institutions in Iran’s history.  
Fourth, after Mossadegh’s removal, the Shah dealt with opposition in two specific ways; 
by jailing and killing or by co-opting it into the already existing Pahlavi regime; for example, 
giving any irresolute individual opposition, government positions. The Shah would never again 
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let any individual or group become too powerful. Sixth, the coup destroyed any relationship 
between Mossadegh’s party, the National Front, which represented the desires of the professional 
middle class, and the Shah. This left the monarchy without any protection against “radicalism of 
the left” or “fanaticism of the right”—the political forces that would force Muhammad Reza 
Shah to flee in 1979.54 Moreover, the repressive ways of the monarch combined with massive 
economic inequality, made it inevitable that an effective opposition force would have to appeal 
to the masses. Finally, seventh, the interference of foreign powers in Iranian internal affairs 
damaged the middle class’s pride and their opinion of the Shah. Consequently, their cooperation 
against the Shah was necessary for the Islamic Revolution of 1979 to be successful.55 
Other scholars and foreign policy experts agree that the coup greatly affected Iran’s 
political development. For instance, Professor James A. Bill, former Director of Middle Eastern 
Studies at the University of Texas, Austin comments, “American policy in Iran during the early 
1950s…paved the way for the incubation of extremism, both of the left and the right.”56  Richard 
Cottam, a previous Foreign Service officer in Tehran and former Professor at the University of 
Pittsburgh also remarked, “U.S. Policy did change Iran’s history in fundamental ways. It helped 
oust nationalist elite which had looked to the U.S. as an ideological ally and its one reliable 
external supporter. In helping eliminate a government that symbolized Iran’s search for national 
integrity and dignity, it helped deny the successor regime nationalist legitimacy.”57  Finally, 
Professor Mark Gasiorowski of Louisiana State University notes, “In retrospect, the United 
States sponsored coup d’etat in Iran of August 19, 1953, has emerged as a critical event in 
postwar world history…had the coup not occurred, Iran’s future would undoubtedly have been 
vastly different.”58 
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Fifty years later, in 1997, representatives of the U.S. finally admitted that intervention in 
the 1953 coup of Mossadegh had a negative impact on the Iranian political system. In 2000, U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright commented: 
"In 1953 the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow 
of Iran's popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh. The Eisenhower 
Administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons; but the 
coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development. And it is easy to see 
now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their 
internal affairs.”59 
4.1.2 The 1963 Uprisings 
In the aftermath of the coup, the development of political pluralism that occurred from 1941 until 
Mossadegh’s overthrow abruptly ceased. The Shah ruled with no constitutional limits—marital 
law was enacted until 1957.  With the exception of 1960-1964, the twenty years after the 
overthrow of Mossadegh was relatively stable politically. The opposition was forced 
underground, rarely active in the public sphere. The Shah had complete control over the 
government; however, he evidently realized his lack of legitimacy. Therefore, he decided to 
create the impression that Iran had a two party system political system. He ordered two of his 
friends, Manouchehr Eqbal and Assadollah Alam, to establish parties that would be controlled 
entirely by the Shah’s supporters.  They created Melliyun (The National Party) and Mardom (The 
People’s Pary), but the population was not fooled. The parties were nicknamed the “yes party” 
and the “yes, sir party”, respectively, by the Iranian public.60 
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By the late 1950s, the United States government was also frustrated with the autocratic 
rule of the Shah insisted he make democratic reforms. To appease Washington, he promoted 
“free and fair” elections for the Twentieth Majles in 1960. But since the two recently created 
royalist parties were the only participants, the Shah was forced to cancel and annul the election 
results because of accusations of fraud. After sever pressure from the Kennedy administration for 
political reform, the Shah appointed Ali Amini, an economist who had no party affiliation, Prime 
Minister in 1961.61  
Amini attempted to implement significant land reforms with the help of his Minister of 
Agriculture, Hasan Arsanjan; however, the Shah forced Amini to resign in 1962 and personally 
assumed responsibility for economic reform. The six original points of the reforms were first 
announced in fall 1961, but the official decree and ratification of the Shah’s White Revolution 
occurred in January 1963, despite objections from political leaders and citizens. The Shah was 
convinced the program would be successful and in 1963 held a nationwide referendum to 
legitimize the program; according to the results, 99.9 percent of Iranian voters supported the 
reforms of the White Revolution.62  The lack of genuine support for the reforms became clear 
when in the summer of 1963 thousands of Iranians encouraged by Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini 
demonstrated against the Shah’s White Revolution. In 1953 the Shah had survived his first 
political crisis with Mossadegh, but would he be able to the same with the second threat to his 
rule, Ruhallah Khomeini? 
Khomeini’s opposition marked a significant turning point in the relationship between the 
state and the Iranian religious community. Until the early 1960s, the relationship between the 
clerical elite and the Shah’s regime had been amiable, if not conciliatory. The primary leaders of 
the religious community (the ulama), Ayatollahs Boroujerdi and Kashani, had supported the 
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Shah in the overthrow of Mossadegh. Therefore, until 1961 when his mentor, Boroujerdi, died 
Khomeini had remained politically silent. But in 1961 he became an Ayatollah and began to 
speak out in opposition of the monarch’s policies between 1962 and 1963, reviving the 
traditional hostility between the state and the clerical leadership. He also emerged as the leader 
of anti-monarchical movement because the regime had destroyed the remnants of the leading 
secular forces like Mossadegh’s National Front by imprisoning its most vocal leaders. With 
Mossadegh on house arrest outside of Tehran, the party had no unifying leader.  By the mid 
1960s it basically ceased to exist, besides underground in Iran and sporadically in Europe.  
Therefore, without much prominent secular resistance to the monarchy, the ulama, specifically 
Khomeini, was driven to the forefront of anti-monarchial politics. 
Khomeini was not the only member of the religious community to oppose the Shah—
with Ayatollah Boroujerdi’s death and Ayatollah Kashani’s illnesses, members of the ulama who 
had not approved of the policies toward the Shah could finally express their disapproval of the 
government openly. Their first opportunity was presented by the Local Council Elections Bill of 
1962, which gave women the right to vote and changed “holy Quran” to “holy book” in 
mandatory oaths of office. The ulama strongly opposed the bill, calling it unconstitutional and 
offensive to Islam. Although most of the religious establishment was against the bill, Khomeini 
was even more vocal. The bill was withdrawn as a result of the ulama’s protests almost two 
months later. This was the first time Ayatollah Khomeini was recognized nationally as a political 
opponent of the Shah.63 
In January 1963, the Shah launched his economic reform, the White Revolution. 
Immediately, Ayatollah Khomeini began to criticize the program, declaring it corrupt, 
disrespectful to the poor, and conciliatory towards the United States. In response, the Shah’s 
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military attacked Khomeini’s base of support—the Fayziya theological school in the holy city of 
Qom. Several students were beaten and killed, intensifying the opposition. At the funeral of the 
students on June 3rd, 1963, Khomeini called for the ouster of the Shah. Two days later, June 5th 
(15th of Khordad on the Persian calendar), he was arrested and protests erupted immediately. 
Demonstrations continued for a week after his arrest in all major Iranian cities—Tehran, Shiraz, 
Mashhad, Isfahan, and Qom—crowds of thousands filled the streets chanting anti-government 
slogans. The government reacted violently and the military killed thousands of Iranians.64  One 
observer reported, “machine gun fire still echoed through the rubble-strewn streets of the bazaar 
area…the troops moved through ruins tracking down enemies of the Shah.”65 
Khomeini was released in August of 1963 after six weeks in prison, but refused to stop 
criticizing the regime’s policies. He urged his followers to boycott the parliamentary elections in 
October 1963 and continued to personally attack the Shah. He was arrested shortly after and held 
until May 1964 when he again resumed criticism of the Shah.  Khomeini attacked the Shah for 
approving a law which granted U.S. military officers in Iran diplomatic immunity, after 
accepting a 200 million dollar loan from American as a “payoff.”66  In October 1964, he 
condemned the Shah in a speech saying, “He reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than 
that of an American dog.”67 After Khomeini’s criticism was circulated as a pamphlet, he was 
deported and exiled; first to Turkey, then to the city of Najaf in Iraq, and finally to Paris in 1978. 
The June uprising of 1963 and the deportation of Khomeini had a large impact on the 
political orientation of the religious community. In the Shah’s attempt to repress clerical 
opposition, he grouped all religious opposition together, rather than recognizing their differences 
and using this to his advantage. With Khomeini in exile, he boasted that his regime defeated “the 
forces of medieval black reaction.”68  This assault unified the ulama, despite their differences, 
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and encouraged supporters of Khomeini to keep his legacy alive in his absence. The Shah’s 
actions also made Iran’s Islamic organizations more radical and anti-monarchial. The 
confrontations in June of 1963 “symbolized the end of peaceful coexistence with the Shah and 
justified the start of an armed struggle against his regime.”69 Groups of university students now 
formed to discuss the use of aggressive political tactics that had emerged in Cuba, Vietnam, and 
Algeria. For example, a student member of one of these organizations commented on the affect 
of the 1963 uprisings:  
“The bloody massacres of 1963 were a major landmark in Iranian history. Until 
then, the opposition had tried to fight the regime with street protests, labor strikes, 
and underground networks. The 1963 bloodbath, however, exposed the 
bankruptcy of these methods. After 1963, militants—irrespective of their 
ideology—had to ask themselves the question: “What is to be done?” The answer 
was clear: “guerrilla warfare.”70 
This ideology spread rapidly among the young intelligentsia in Iranian universities, who 
were frustrated with the lack of success they had encountered with traditional political parties 
like the National Front and the Tudeh Party.  
Accordingly, from 1960 until Khomeini’s exile, the Shah experienced formidable 
challenges to his rule.  But the opposition was not unified behind one effective leader or party, so 
he was easily able to overcome the dissent with military repression.  The most important political 
event, however, was Khomeini’s transformation from an unknown cleric to a religious and 
political leader. Iranians, even those with no regard for Islam, respected Khomeini’s talent and 
courage in mobilizing opposition forces against the Shah. 
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4.1.3 Political Oppression after 1963 
After 1963, Mohammad Reza Shah ruled as a monarchic dictator who refused to allow any 
political opposition. Like his father, he maintained power by solidifying the institutions of his 
rule—the bureaucracy, the control of oil revenues, the apparatuses of social control and 
repression (SAVAK), and the most important, the loyalty of his military. He kept these 
institutions alive and dominant by massive military expenditures. For instance, from 1963 to 
1973, the army grew from 180,000 to 200,000; the air force from 7,500 to 100,000; the navy 
from 2,000 to 25,000; and the Imperial Guard from 2,000 to 8,000. The military budget also 
increased from $293 million to $1.8 billion.71  The regime expanded so much it had full control 
over the everyday lives of citizens— by the early 1970s, the government hired one of every two 
full time employees. This gave the regime the power over citizens’ benefits, wages, and a wide 
range of social necessities. 
After the 1963 Uprisings, the Shah also went out of his way to disenfranchise one group 
in particular, the religious clerics.  In 1971, the regime created a “Religious Corps” whose 
members travelled the country teaching the regime’s version of Islam.  By 1975, the Shah closed 
and destroyed most of the theological seminaries in the holy city of Mashhad, claiming to be 
clearing the area around the shrine of the Eighth Imam so that visitors could worship more 
freely.  He also shut down the nation’s primary clerical school in Qom, Fazieh-e Ghom, and 
accused some of the most scholarly ulama of incompetence; he forbade them from giving 
sermons or leading prayer. The Shah even changed the official state calendar from the Islamic 
version to a new, imperial one.72 
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 From 1965-1975, the number of mosques in Iran plummeted from 20,000 to 9,015.73  
The regime left no religious organization untouched; even student associations were infiltrated 
and dissolved by SAVAK.  In Iranian Universities, all political student groups prohibited and 
any noticeably politically active students faced severe punishment that ranged from expulsion 
from school, torture, imprisonment, and even death, even during periods of relative calm. Many 
witnesses claim that overly political or religious students would disappear and never be seen 
again.  
During this period, the religious clerics also increasingly feared the Shah’s modernization 
policies would take away all of their influence. The regime secularized the education and legal 
systems and made drastic cuts in government subsidies to the ulama.  When the regime 
forcefully encouraged women in the mid 1970s to remove the traditional Islamic dress in public, 
both the clergy and religious lay people were outraged. The religious community viewed the 
Shah’s actions as a violation of the sanctity of women and the imposition of a moral threat to 
society. However, the clerics used this repression to gain support from the Iranian population. 
For instance, a prominent cleric attributed “the awakening of Iran’s religious community” to the 
“frontal attack of his Majesty” in an interview in late 1975.  His assertion was correct—in 1976 a 
survey found there were over forty eight publishers of religious books in Tehran, thirty six of 
which had started publishing between 1965 and 1975, a direct result of political restraints on 
religious materials.74  Additionally, when female students wearing chadors (traditional Islamic 
dress) were forbidden to register for classes at the University of Tehran, mass protests broke out 
on university campuses all over Tehran. Hundreds were injured from being beaten by SAVAK.   
The Shah decided he needed another means by which he could to consolidate his power and fully 
control the state.  
  51 
In March 1975, the Shah announced the dissolution of the two existing political parties 
and the establishment of a single majority party, Hezb-e  Rastakhiz-e Melli, The National 
Resurgence Party.  In 1960 he had denounced the one party system as “communistic and not be 
tolerated in Iran”, but now the Shah insisted the Resurgence Party would be the only legal 
political party. He demanded Iranians support the party fully, or face being imprisoned or forced 
to leave the country. The formation of the Resurgence Party caused a drastic increase in political 
tensions. One of the main theological schools in Qom shut down in protest and a street 
confrontation with the government followed.  Over 250 seminary students were detained or 
beaten.  By the end of 1975, the government had hundreds of religious clerics, professors, 
novelists, film makers, lawyers, and political leaders imprisoned for opposing the Resurgence 
Party and its growing control over government ministries.75  
Accordingly, international human rights organizations began to express concerns about 
the Shah’s regime. In late 1975, Amnesty International announced that Iran had anywhere 
between 25,000 and 100,000 political prisoners. The organization reported,  
“No country in the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran…The Shah 
of Iran retains his benevolent image despite the highest rate of death penalties in 
the world, no valid system of civilian courts and a history of torture which is 
beyond belief.”76 
In 1976, Abul Hassan Bani-Sadr, who would become the Islamic Republic’s first 
president, could no longer hide his condemnation of the Shah.  While in exile in Paris, he 
published an oppositional pamphlet titled “Fifty Years of Treason” criticizing the Shah for 
murdering political opponents, shooting unarmed protesters, ignoring the traditional Iranian 
national identity, and most heinous, hijacking religion for use in politics.  The work, released on 
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the fiftieth anniversary of the Pahlavi monarchy, accused the dynasty of political, economic, 
cultural, and social abuses saying, “These fifty years, contain fifty counts of treason.”77 
Ayatollah Hassan Bani-Sadr’s article represented many members of the young 
intelligentsia and the religious community who were appalled by the lack of political freedoms 
under the Shah. For example, in May, 1977, a group of sixty four lawyers signed a petition 
demanding the establishment of an independent judiciary and formed an Association of Jurists to 
monitor the enforcement of Iranian law. Only a month later the Iranian Writers Association 
began a similar initiative, demanding that the regime end media censorship and allow the 
publishing of independent political journals. Their requests were denied and in response, 
SAVAK black listed the lawyers and writers petitioning for political freedom, calling them 
“hooligans” and “supporters of international terrorism.”78  In the next weeks, seven separate 
politically active citizens (mostly lawyers, writers, or party leaders) were beaten and their houses 
were bombed, including Mehdi Bazargan, the future head of Iran’s interim government in 1979.  
The regime’s violent tactics could not obliterate the political opposition, but did force 
much of it underground. Because secular parties like the National Front, the Tudeh Party, and the 
Liberation Movement were closely monitored by SAVAK, the religious opposition emerged 
from the safety of the mosque to lead the movement against the Shah. By alienating the ulama 
from the public sphere, political organizations and events had to be moved to the mosques.  As a 
result, even secular Iranians ventured to religious centers to express their political views against 
the regime. More importantly, the Shah’s persecution of the entire ulama, encouraged diverse 
religious leaders to unite despite their previous ideological differences.  
By summer 1977, the Shah had been made aware of the national frustrations and tried to 
remedy the situation by publicizing “liberalization” policies such as freedom of the press and 
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free and fair elections.  The regime began to tolerate a certain amount of criticism, the Red Cross 
visited Iranian prisons, and approximately 400 political prisoners were released. However, these 
efforts were too late. Frustrations against the Shah’s political and economic policies had been 
developing for more than two decades; slight liberalization would not appease the opposition.  
Moreover, shortly after these new “freedoms” were announced, the regime made its position on 
dissent very clear. The harassment, beating, and imprisonment of opposition became common 
again in the fall and in October 1977, Ayatollah Khomeini’s oldest son, Mustafa, mysteriously 
died, thought to be another victim of SAVAK.  The regime’s violent political oppression aided in 
the development of the mass protest movements that would begin in1978.   
On January 7, 1978, the Shah’s regime published an article in a Tehran newspaper 
slandering Ayatollah Khomeini that claimed he was a descendent of Indian immigrants and a 
supporter of British colonialism, hoping to decrease his popularity with the masses. Instead, the 
article set off a wave of protests in Qom with anywhere from 4,000 to 10,000 Iranians protesting; 
anywhere from ten to eighty Iranians were killed in the confrontation with the military. The 
violence incited protests that occurred regularly at 40 day intervals, commemorating the deaths 
of protesters according to Islamic tradition.79 These cyclical demonstrations are considered the 
beginning of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. 
The government’s ruthless killings forced fairly moderate clerics, such as Grand 
Ayatollah Shariatmadari, to deem the Shah’s regime “un-Islamic”.  By the spring of 1978, the 
oppression and violence became intolerable to the ulama.  Imperial Guards raided Ayatollah’s 
Shariatmadari’s home in the holy city of Qom, allegedly mistaking it for the residence of a more 
radical cleric. They shot and killed two of Shariatmadari’s seminary students who had taken 
refuge in his home. Witnesses claim the students were killed because they refused to chant 
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“Long Live the Shah”.  Shortly afterwards, the government made a formal apology. In fact, the 
Shah personally apologized to the Ayatollah, began a media campaign criticizing the imperial 
guards, replaced the head of SAVAK, and pledged to continue the program of political 
liberalization. The Shah also promised the people free elections in the future and extended free 
press freedoms. The Shah’s conciliatory approach seemed to appease the Iranian people 
temporarily; the number of protests dropped drastically over the next few months.  But in late 
summer 1978, two events—a fire at the Rex Movie Theatre and the Black Friday protest in Jaleh 
Square—served as the breaking point for internal pressure.  
On August 19, 1978 (the anniversary of the overthrow of Mossadegh in 1953) over four 
hundred people were burned alive in the Rex Movie Theatre in a working class section of the 
city of Abadan.  It was the sixth theatre that was burned during the holy month of Ramadan in 
Iran that year, most likely a reaction to the Shah’s modernization policies (Fischer 197). The 
regime blamed internal religious opposition to Western culture, but locals suspected SAVAK. 
Multiple witnesses said it took fire fighters over thirty minutes to get to the scene and many of 
the fire hydrants were defective. Another witness accused the police, whose station was located 
only a block from the theatre, of failing to free those trapped in the building. One witness 
recounted, “The screams of the dying carried into the streets as would-be rescuers stood by 
helplessly.”80  After the burials of the victims, 10,000 relatives and friends marched into the city 
shouting “the shah must go” and “burn the shah, end the Pahlavi’s.  
The Shah tried to appease the opposition by giving it more freedom. In late August 1978, 
he announced that Iran would be “a Western-styled democracy”; all parties except the Tudeh 
would be allowed to run in the next parliamentary elections.81  But these “freedoms” did not stop 
the development of the resistance movement. On September 4, hundreds of Iranians celebrated 
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the end of the religious holiday, Ramadan, with outdoor prayer. After the religious observances, 
almost 100,000 protesters gathered and marched peacefully in Tehran. Three days later, the 
crowds grew even larger, forcing the Shah to ban all street demonstrations and to declare martial 
law for twelve major Iranian cities, the first time it had been imposed since 1963.82 Because the 
Shah announced the imposition of martial law in the early morning hours of September 7th 1978, 
many Iranians were not aware of the decree. Therefore, on the morning of September 8th 
thousands marched to Jaleh Sqaure to demonstrate.  
Large crowds marched and gathered together at Jaleh Square, the area where most of the 
bazaaris resided in Tehran. When the military ordered the opposition to leave, about 5,000 
protesters staged a peaceful sit in. Military commandos and tanks surrounded the square, but the 
protesters refused to disperse. Observers say shots were fired first in the air, then at the crowd. A 
European reporter said, “The scene resembled a firing squad, with troops shooting at a mass of 
stationary protesters.”83 The government claimed 87 were killed and 205 wounded in the protest, 
but the actual total has been estimated somewhere between 3,000 to 4,000 casualties.84 
The Jaleh Square Massacre, also known as “Black Friday” or “Bloody Friday”, 
symbolized the contradictory nature of the Shah’s regime—after hearing about the murder of 
hundreds of Iranians, the Shah was reportedly horrified and shocked at the ruthless approach of 
Tehran’s Military Governor . But the killings were a result of his government’s lack of 
efficiency; he had evidently given one passive order to the civilian authorities and another more 
confrontational order to the military. For the first time during his rule, crowds began to shout, 
“Death to the Shah.”85   The Massacre at Jaleh Square eliminated any possibility of a 
government compromise and sent Iran into political anarchy.  
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To regain control, on November 5th, 1978 the Shah replaced the government of Prime 
Minister Sharif Emami with a military regime led by General Azhari. Even so, the Shah still 
insisted on publicly announcing his “liberalization” efforts.  But these contradictory stances only 
fueled the opposition; when the Shah lifted censorship in the fall of 1978, newspapers were 
flooded with reports of SAVAK’s political torture chambers and personal accounts of horrifying 
interrogation tactics. The reports only exacerbated the resentment of Iranians who participated in 
the Jaleh Square demonstrations.86  
Intensifying tensions even more, the Shah acknowledged “the revolution” developing 
throughout the country and arrogantly claimed he would lead it. He said in a nationally 
broadcasted speech on November 6th, 1978: 
“Dear Iranian people, in the climate of liberalization which gradually began two 
years ago, you arose against oppression and corruption. The revolution of the 
Iranian people cannot fail to have my support as the monarch of Iran and as an 
Iranian. I have heard the message of your revolution…Remember that I stand by 
you in your revolution against colonialism, oppression and corruption. I will be 
with you in safeguarding out integrity and national unity, the protection of Islamic 
precepts, the establishment of fundamental freedoms, and victory in realizing the 
demands and aspirations of the Iranian nation.”87 
The speech only demonstrated the Shah’s ignorance of the Iranian public’s desire for 
regime change. Many observers and scholars believe this marked the collapse of the monarchy—
Milani deems it, “the obituary of the Pahlavi’s read by the Shah himself.”88 It became evident to 
both the opposition and supporters of the monarchy that the Shah had lost control of the state. 
Accordingly, the opposition, especially those led by Khomeini, capitalized on the opportunity by 
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provoking strikes that started on university campuses and spread to government offices, banks, 
bazaars, private businesses and factories, and even the oil industry. The whole country had gone 
on strike. Demonstrations also continued to break out; the most violent occurred during the ten 
holy days of Muharram (the beginning of December and the first month of the Islamic calendar), 
when thousands were killed by the military across the country. On the tenth day of Muharram, 
Ashura (December 11th, 1978) two million protesters marched in a peaceful demonstration in 
Tehran, the largest of its kind. But by mid December, violence in the streets and labor strikes 
were daily occurrences; it was apparent the Shah would have to leave the country.  
On December 30th, 1978 the Shah appointed Shapour Bakhtiar, a leader of the National 
Front, Prime Minister. But he was immediately disowned by his own party because of his 
negotiations with both the monarch and Khomeini. By January 13th, the Shah created a regency 
council headed by Bhaktiar and it was announced the monarch would shortly be leaving the 
country for a short “vacation.”89 
Finally, on January 16th, 1979 the Shah left Iran and would never come back again. With 
the absence of the Shah, the developments of the revolution unraveled quickly. By February 1st, 
Khomeini had returned to Iran from Paris and only four days later he appointed Mehdi Bazargan, 
a well known religious intellectual, the “real” Prime Minister. During the weekend of February 
9th through the 11th there was intense fighting and hundreds of casualties. The Imperial Guard 
attempted to repress rebellions of air force trainees and technicians along with other movements 
led by guerrilla groups like the Mojahedin and Fedeiyan. After a weekend of armed struggle, the 
army was finally defeated on Sunday, February 11th, 1970.  That same day, Bakhtiar resigned 
and went into hiding, giving Khomeini and his coalition the opportunity to take control. On 
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Sunday evening the nation radio announced, “This is the voice of Tehran, the voice of true Iran, 
the voice of the revolution. The dictatorship has come to an end.”90 
4.2  POLITICAL GRIEVANCES—GREEN MOVEMENT 2009 
The new regime’s political oppression began in the weeks and months following the Islamic 
Revolution. The interim government and its military courts harshly sentenced prominent figures 
of the former regime to death and had them executed. Between February 1979 and June 1981 
revolutionary courts had officially executed 497 “political opponents” of the regime, but the 
actual death toll is thought to be no higher than one thousand.91 The rapidity and brutality of the 
executions was explained by a provisional government official: 
“We believe…that to destroy and kill evil is part of the truth and that the purging 
of society of these persons means paving the way for unified society in which 
classes will not exist…to execute evildoers is the great mission of Moslems in 
order to realise the perfection of nature and society. We execute…to break the 
chains and fetters that confined and restricted the weak in our society for many 
years…Our aim is to execute the corrupt regime. The execution of the traitor 
Generals is the beginning of the execution of the regime.”92  
In addition, members of the newly created “Revolutionary Guard” engaged in ad hoc 
executions throughout the country. Political retribution became extremely common and there 
was no authority to stop it during the interim government. These brutal tactics foreshadowed the 
strict political and social policies that would emerge under the rule of the Islamic Republic.  
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The new regime rapidly consolidated its power with the enforcement of the new Islamic 
constitution in early December 1979. Then, in September 1980 the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war 
provided the Islamic government with justification to centralize power and expand the state 
apparatus. For instance, the Ministry of Justice extended its power over the legal system and the 
Ministry of Islamic Guidance created the “Cultural Revolution” in April 1980 to eliminate 
“cultural imperialism”, rid all forms of cultural resistance to Islamic rule, and purge Iran of all 
foreign culture—any Western political ideas or social norms had to be expelled. By May 1980 
Khomeini created the Council of the Cultural Revolution (CCR) to enforce the reforms and 
proclaimed to the nation: 
“Culture forms the identity and being of a community. With a perverse culture, no 
matter how powerful a community may be economically, politically, industrially, 
and militarily, that community is vain and empty…Iran had been hurt more by 
Westernized intellectuals than by any other group of men. Cultural reform and 
freeing our youth from dependency on Western culture precede all other 
reforms”93 
The Council of the Cultural Revolution strictly enforced Islamic dress code rules, 
removed and arrested all employees who practiced the Bahai Faith (a monotheistic religion 
emphasizing unity that had been founded in 19th century Persia) from government positions, 
imposed state control over television and radio, banned all foreign films, music, art, and 
literature, and prohibited the wearing of foreign fashion. The Cultural Revolution also 
diminished women’s rights— the Family Protection Law of 1967 was repealed, lowering the 
legal marriage age for young girls to thirteen and permitting husbands to divorce their wives 
without court approval. Additionally, all women employees, including notable judges, were 
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purged from the judicial system. Those who opposed the Cultural Revolution were fined, 
physically punished, or imprisoned. The Ministry of Islamic Guidance spent the next decade 
purging Iran of everything and everyone that was “non- Islamic”.  
The Iranian education system was most affected by the reforms of the Cultural 
Revolution. The government closed all universities and colleges across the country for three 
years in order to restructure the curricula. Khomeini approved the removal of all “subversive 
elements” in Iranian universities on the grounds that they had only produced communists and 
atheists.94  Thousands of secular professors were purged from the system, some even exiled for 
their “Western” approaches to education. By the time universities reopened, it is estimated that 
almost 15 percent of the courses required to graduate dealt with Shi’i Islamic law.95  
More importantly, however, the “cleansing” of the universities allowed the Islamic 
regime to begin its campaign to eradicate all political opposition, specifically the Mojahedin and 
the Leftists, who had used universities from 1979 to 1981 to engage in ideological debate. In the 
summer of 1980, the Council of the Cultural Revolution ordered all political groups to leave 
campus or face punishment. Bloody clashes between students and government forces occurred 
all over Iran, killing anywhere from 20 to 200 students and injuring many more. By 1984, most 
political opposition—the monarchists, the Tudeh, the Mojahedin, Fadaiyan, and the 
nationalists—was destroyed by the Islamic Republic. Widespread violent repression against 
party leaders coupled with intimidation tactics used against their constituents, forced the majority 
of these parties to conduct their activities in exile in Europe, the United States, or Iraq. As a 
result of the regime’s brutal oppression, by June 1985 over 8,000 political opponents had been 
executed.96 
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Besides political oppression, the new Islamic state also sought to suppress all ethnic 
movements, specifically the Kurdish opposition movement, which demanded more cultural and 
political rights for ethnic minorities. The Kurds and other minorities like the Turkmans and the 
Baluch were mostly Sunni Muslims and were persecuted for their religious differences.  For 
example, in the fall of 1984, 94 members of a Peasants’ Council in Turkman-Sahra, in northeast 
Iran, were arrested— their bodies were later found dumped in a remote area of the region.  
Shortly afterwards Ayatollah Khalkhali, a loyal supporter of the regime, admitted without 
remorse, “I myself executed these people. I executed ninety-four people, not just one person…I 
beat the people of the Turkman.”97  These types of ethnic killings were not uncommon in the 
first decade after the revolution and still continue sporadically.  
Political, religious, and ethnic repression continued throughout the mid to late 1980s, but 
the regime focused most of its energy on the war with Iraq—Khomeini viewed the conflict as an 
opportunity to export the regime’s revolutionary ideology. However, by 1988 he had to accede to 
the reality that in order for the Islamic state to survive, the war must end. Over 1 million Iranians 
had been killed during the eight year struggle. Weeks after consenting to the U.N cease fire 
Khomeini expressed his disappointment, “Death and martyrdom would have been more bearable 
to me…How unhappy I am because I have survived and have drunk the poisonous chalice of 
accepting the resolution.”98 
Following the end of the war, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, who was now eighty 
eight years old, was forced to deal with growing criticism of the Islamic Republic.  Ayatollah 
Hoseyn Ali Montazeri, Khomeini’s hand-picked successor, had begun to speak out against the 
Islamic government in the late 1980s and promoted a more open and democratic political system.  
When Iran executed over 3,000 war prisoners, he publicly criticized Khomeini and accused the 
  62 
government of human rights violations.  Furthermore, he encouraged the regime to apologize for 
its wrongdoings and admit past mistakes. Shortly after in early February 1988, Khomeini warned 
Montazeri in a private letter and insinuated that his actions were liberal and unacceptable. He 
wrote, “I shall not allow the government to fall in to the hands of the liberalha (liberals).”99  
Only weeks later, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa calling for the death of the author Salman 
Rushdie, who had written the Satanic Verses.  The novel questioned the authority of the Koran 
and depicted Muhammad in a manner that some Muslims deemed insolent. Khomeini called the 
work blasphemous and accused Rushdie of being an apostate for satirizing the Prophet—he even 
offered bounty for Rushdie’s assassination.100  Montazeri quickly resigned in protest and went 
into hiding in Qom. He warned Khomeini and other conservative members of the regime that the 
world was starting to believe “that our business in Iran is just murdering people.”101 
4.2.1 After Khomeini’s Death 
The death of Ayatollah Khomeini on June 3rd, 1989 brought about a drastic change in political 
leadership that has been described as a shift “from paternalism to presidentialism” by many 
scholars.102  An amended constitution gave the President more authority by eliminating the 
position of the Prime Minister and by weakening the independence of the Council of Guardians. 
Additionally, Article 107 of the new constitution diminished the Supreme Leader’s (faqih) 
religious authority by eliminating the condition that he must be a marja’-e taqlid, a source of 
religion emulation or imitation.103  This echoed one of Khomeini’s last fatwas, which had placed 
the interests of the Islamic state over the authority of Islamic law. Therefore, by instituting these 
constitutional reforms, Khomeini strengthened the institutions and populist nature of the state, 
ensuring the survival of the Islamic Republic of Iran despite his absence. 
  63 
Ayatollah Seyed Ali Hoseyni  Khamenei was selected as the new Supreme Leader 
immediately following Khomeini’s death and on July 28th, 1989 Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani won the presidential election.  Khamenei, who had just been given the title of 
Ayatollah, spent most of his first years as Supreme Leader solidifying his authority and seeking 
supporters—proving to the Iranian public, government, and military that he had legitimate 
political and religious power.  Simultaneously, President Rafsanjani publicly announced that all 
covert organizations used for political repression would be terminated and that a sense of order 
would be restored to the nation. He combined the country’s law enforcement units into one 
central organization and created strict exams which would eliminate unqualified members of the 
Revolutionary Guard. Additionally, governing religious bodies that were once in Qom were 
brought to Tehran to be better supervised. These measures sounded impressive, but the much of 
the process was never completed. Most of the ad hoc revolutionary councils remained intact and 
large religious foundations responsible for violence after the revolution went untouched—
Rafsanjani’s promises of liberal reconstruction never materialized.  
 In fact, during Rafsanjani’s terms as president, the Guardian Council did not approve one 
application to create a political party.  Furthermore, it refused more than 1,000 of the 3,000 
candidates in the Majles election of 1992.104  By 1994 censorship had become so intolerable that 
134 of Iran’s leading intellectuals and authors published a statement criticizing “certain 
individuals, institutions and groups related to the government” for prohibiting necessary 
academic and journalistic research and defending “the human and civil right of free thought.”105 
Almost half of the signatories were either imprisoned or murdered by the regime.  That same 
year, a United Nations report deemed Iran one of the most repressive regimes in the world, 
estimating its number of political prisoners to be approximately 19,000.  The UN cited the 
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following as inexcusable: “the high number of executions, cases of torture and cruel, inhumane 
or degrading treatment or punishment…lack of adequate protection for minorities... excessive 
force in suppressing demonstrations, restrictions on the freedom of expression, thought, opinion 
and the press…”106 
But the violence was not only within Iran—the government also assassinated opposition 
figures in exile—the most notable were the killings of Kurdish leader Abdol Rahman Qasemlu in 
1990 and Shahpour Bakhtiar, the head of Iran’s first interim government, in 1991. Another four 
Iranian Kurdish oppositionists were assassinated in Berlin in 1992 and the Islamic regime is also 
blamed for a myriad of assassinations in that occurred in Argentina and Israel.  Furthermore, 
John Deutsche, former director of the CIA, stated that from 1989 to 1996, the Islamic regime had 
murdered at least 48 of its Iranian political opponents who lived abroad.107 
The continuation of oppression and violence, abroad and within the country, not only 
frustrated the public, but also prominent political leaders associated with the Islamic regime. For 
instance, shortly before his death in 1995, Mehdi Bazargan told the German newspaper, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, that the regime was losing legitimacy and that theocracy had the support 
of less than five percent of the Iranian population.  A few months later, the leader of Iran’s 
leading secular party, Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, reiterated Bazargan’s assertions and said, "We have a 
political crisis. We have an economic crisis. We have a social crisis. That creates uncertainty and 
unpredictability…”108  Frustrations were rapidly developing; it was time for a new period of 
reform. 
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4.2.2 Khatami’s Rule 
In May 1997, an overwhelming 70 percent of Iran’s electorate voted for Mohammad Khatami, a 
mild mannered cleric with a liberal reputation, as president. His unexpected victory broadened 
political participation and prompted the growth of a new reform movement. Immediately after 
the victory, reformers established a new newspaper Khordad (May), which promoted free and 
public discussion of Iranian politics. The president’s government encouraged the expansion of 
the Iranian media—within the first two years of his inauguration, the country’s press publications 
quadrupled.109 Additionally, the authorities tolerated more modern Islamic dress and Western 
influenced stores and coffee shops flourished all in urban areas.  The judiciary was reopened to 
women, the marriage age was raised, and legislation restricted distinctions between men and 
women in all universities and legal courts. 
Despite the gradual progress, the Islamic regime used its judicial power to fight the 
reforms, which it saw as a violation of the theological foundations of the state. Conservative MPs 
obstructed Khatami’s legislative efforts, and the government shut down media outlets and 
imprisoned vocal reform leaders. As Maloney remarks, the conservatives, “stripped the reform 
movements of its strategists, its initiatives, and its popular mandate.”110  Additionally, in the end 
of 1998, four well known reformers and political activists were found brutally murdered, 
presumably by the regime. The assassinations were supposed to be a warning to reformers, but 
instead incited even more unrest and protests, especially from the student community.  In July 
1999, the conservatives were preparing to institute a harsh press law and on July 8th closed the 
journal Salaam, the first liberal effort in the post Khomeini period.111  Peaceful protests 
immediately broke out on university campuses. The next day, July 9th, the government decided 
this violation of the law needed to be stopped—a vigilante group associated with the government 
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(Ansar-e Hezbollah, Friends of the Party of God) stormed dorms at the University of Tehran, 
beating and harassing students who looked as though they were a part of the reform movement. 
A student described his experience saying,  
“God, it could not be described in any words: walls demolished, cupboards 
destroyed, students' belongings thrown out through the windows. Even some 
students who had been sleeping or doing their morning prayers were thrown out 
through the windows from the second and the third floors… I was arrested by the 
agents of the intelligence ministry, while standing by the gate of Tehran 
University. They put me in a cage, which was laid on the back of a pickup truck, 
and took me to a building which belonged to the police…Then they beat me and 
two other students severely… they beat me on the soles of my feet with a cable 
for four continuous days and I was also subject to psychological torture for a 
month.”112  
In reaction to the brutal violence upwards of 70,000 people demonstrated in the streets of Tehran 
in the six days following the incident.  Over 1500 protestors were arrested and dozens of students 
were severely injured or killed.113 
Khatami immediately responded to the attacks, saying, “Violence in any shape or form is 
abhorrent and deplorable…their [supporters of violence] guilt is compounded when they use 
violence on the basis of religious sanctions”.  Moreover, Khatami’s intelligence minister, 
Hojatoleslam Ali Yunesi, also condemned the violence, vowing to find and prosecute the 
vigilantes.114  But the attempts of the Khatami’s regime to take control of the aftermath failed—
the government cracked down on reformists, continued to restrict free media, and put harsh 
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constraints on student gatherings. While the demonstrations signaled the people’s desire for 
political freedom, the government made it clear that protests, even peaceful ones, would not be 
tolerated and would be met with violent repression. 
In early 2000, the reform movement attempted to encourage change within the regime by 
promoting participation from disenchanted constituents. As a result over 80 percent of the voting 
population gave the reformist camp the majority of seats in the Parliament.115 This gave 
Khatami’s coalition the power to win support for over one hundred bills of reform in the 
Majles—the most prominent banned torture, gave political prisoners the right to legal counsel, 
granted women equal rights in divorce court, mandated trial judges had at least ten years of court 
experience, and allowed the president to remove judges at his will.  Khatami also increased 
financial support to nongovernmental organizations—cultural centers, theatres, musical venues, 
student organizations, and independent media began to develop again. For example, the number 
of daily newspapers rose from five to twenty six and their total daily circulation rose from 1.2 
million to 3.2 million.  However, in the months after the parliamentary elections the government 
retaliated again by imprisoning the most prominent leaders of the reform, weakening the 
organization of the movement. It also launched a campaign to restore the laws Khatami’s 
coalition had overturned.   
Despite the threat of violence, student activism remained powerful throughout Khatami’s 
presidency. In November 2002, hundreds of students demonstrated against the proclamation of 
the death sentence for the prominent Professor, Hashem Aghajari, who had been charged with 
the crime of apostasy for questioning the regime’s interpretation of Islamic law. Only months 
later, in June 2003, riots broke out over the possibility of the privatization of universities and the 
demonstrations, which lasted several nights, quickly turned into forceful protests against the 
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regime. Rioters yelled slogans like “Death to the Supreme Leader” and “We want democracy” 
and placed tape over their mouths to comment on the lack of free speech.116  Then, in October 
2003, the reform movement was encouraged when Shirin Ebadi, a human rights lawyer who 
fought for women and children’s rights in Iran, won the Nobel Peace Prize. The conservatives 
reacted with repugnance, while the reformists celebrated—she was the first Iranian and the first 
Muslim women to be given the award. 
However, the reformists’ joy in 2003 was premature; the last two years of Khatami’s 
presidency saw little progressive improvements. The 2004 parliamentary elections were 
manipulated by the Guardian Council that denied over 2,000 candidates for being too liberal. By 
2005, conservative and hard line tendencies in the government had been strengthened and the 
Majles was dominated by conservative MPs, paving the way for president to emerge.117 
4.2.3 Ahmadinejad’s Election 
From 1997 until 2005, Iran’s politics was dominated by the hope of progressive reform. Even 
though most Iranians knew political change would be difficult to achieve, as long as Khatami 
was in office there had been a viable mechanism for altering the Islamic system. However, with 
the election of the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, the hostility between the proponents of 
change and the traditional Islamic regime was significantly heightened. 
From the beginning of his presidency, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a populist “in style and 
substance”, was determined to make the revolutionary ideals the center of Iranian politics.118 He 
rapidly increased the powers of the Revolutionary Guard and the regime’s security agencies and 
filled his cabinet and administration with former Revolutionary Guards.  He also immediately 
purged the ministries of interior, finance, national planning, and foreign affairs ministries of all 
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those appointed during Rafsanjani’s or Khatami’s presidency. Furthermore, he blatantly ignored 
presidential procedures and regulations. For example, he stopped attending meetings of the 
Defense Council and bypassed the foreign ministry by appointing his own envoys to Middle 
Eastern Countries.  
It is important to note that Ahmadinejad’s power to make such changes does not come 
from the office of the presidency, but from his alliance with the most powerful man in Iran, 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Their partnership stems from their similar views—the 
importance of Islamic values in Iran’s politics, a distrust of the West and its policies, and most 
importantly, the revival of the Islamic Revolution’s original ideas and political tactics. Referring 
to Ahmadinejad, Ayatollah Khamenei commented in 2007, “Thanks to the Iranian nation’s 
endeavor and the nation’s choice today, a government has been elected whose principled and 
fundamental slogans are the same as the original slogans of the revolution…and this is why I 
thank God for this government…”119  With the unwavering support of Khamenei, Ahmadinejad 
has rid his cabinet of any liberals, forced the resignation of prominent rivals such as Ali Larijani, 
and been able to rescind reforms made under Khatami’s presidency. Therefore, only two years 
into Ahmadinejad’s term, the Revolutionary Guard had become an economic and political 
authority. Their members headed the ministries of culture, intelligence, and interior and even 
controlled state television. Press censorship and the persecution of journalists, bloggers, and 
literary critics greatly increased and students became the new target of Ahmadinejad’s 
conservative platform. 
Ahmadinejad aggressively prohibited student activism—in 2006 he publicly expressed 
his disgust for “liberal and secular university lectures” and promised to rid campuses across the 
country of progressive political environments.120  His approach was effective in repressing 
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opposition because 70 percent of Iran’s population at the time was under the age of thirty and 
their central meeting place was Iran’s university campuses. In the months that followed dozens 
of students were imprisoned, hundreds of liberal professors were forced to retire early, and 
Ahmadinejad appointed a radical cleric as the new chancellor of the University of Tehran.  One 
student commented on the changes since Ahmadinejad became president, saying,  
“They have sent our professors into early retirement; prevented many students 
from continuing their studies; forbidden not only protest, but even the act of 
breathing freely; and transformed our universities into military garrisons. Don’t 
think that our patience is unlimited. Someday, the pot will boil over.”121 
The pot finally boiled over in December 2006, when students commemorated Student’s 
Day by interrupting an Ahmadinejad speech, burning his picture, and shouting anti-government 
slogans. Again, in May, October, and December of 2007 demonstrations broke out demanding 
more social and political freedoms.  
By 2008, frustrations in Iran were rising rapidly. Ahmadinejad’s constant rhetoric 
denying the Holocaust and promoting Iran’s nuclear weapons program created tension abroad 
and conflicts between ruling clerics. Additionally, his economic promises to help the 
disenfranchised were not even close to fulfillment. But most importantly, the young population, 
disillusioned and resentful, was becoming increasingly unable to cope with the severe pressure of 
the Islamic regime’s policies. Education and urbanization produced a new form of widespread 
animosity towards the harsh social and political controls imposed by the Islamic government. For 
example, although satellite television had been officially banned since 1994, they were in 
widespread use and gave millions of Iranian access to Western news, film, art, and music. The 
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younger population became more aware than ever of the distinct contrast between the limitations 
on their personal lives and the freedoms enjoyed by many other countries.  
The harsh enforcement of Islamic dress code for both men and women were just the 
beginning of government’s effort to control the cultural life of youth under Ahmadinejad’s first 
term. Strict regulations regarding alcohol and interaction with the opposite sex were constantly 
monitored and intermittent crackdowns created an atmosphere of tension and uneasiness. 
Additionally, since the university was one of the only settings where social interaction amongst 
the sexes was permitted, high school graduates were put under a vast amount of stress to do well 
on the college entrance exam, concour. However, in 2008, there were only 400,000 places for the 
2 million aspiring applicants. These pressures have taken a drastic toll on the youth of Iran.  The 
UN announced in 2008 that Iran had one of the highest rates of drug usage in the Middle East; it 
harbors over two million addicts.  Suicide rates had rapidly increased in the past ten years and 
the Islamic government itself reported that prostitution had risen by 635 percent.122 The youth of 
Iran needed hope; an outlet in which they could express their frustrations and discontents—this 
would be provided in the formation of the Green Movement in 2009. 
In the 2009 presidential election, 500 candidates filed for candidacy, but only four—
Ahmadinejad, Mousavi, Karrubi, and Rezai—were approved by the Guardian Council.  As the 
campaign began, Mousavi emerged as the reform candidate emphasizing Iran’s need for more 
political freedom, less censorship, and more efficient economic policies. He also championed 
women’s rights, the disbanding of the “morality police” who enforce dress codes and interactions 
between the sexes, and the expansion of social and political rights on university campuses. His 
platform resonated with the young and progressive—networks of supporters were created all 
over the country, formerly silent women’s groups and student organizations took on a new, more 
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confrontational approach, and his supporters reached out to all Iranians via social networking 
sites like Facebook and Twitter. By the day of the presidential election, June 12th, the excitement 
in the country was palpable—citizens waited in line for over 4 hours to be able to cast their vote. 
Most Iranians believed not only that their vote would count, but that it could enact drastic change 
in their everyday lives. 
Immediately after Ahmadinejad was announced the winner, hundreds of thousands 
converged on the streets of Tehran to protest the decision and the government reacted violently. 
As protests continued, the paramilitary forces unleashed by the government beat and arrested 
hundreds of demonstrators. The opposition to the government at one point numbered 3 million 
protestors—the largest anti-government movement seen since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. 
4.3 ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES—THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 
 
Until his removal in 1941, Reza Shah had engaged in intense reforms, modeled after the policies 
of Ataturk in Turkey. His goal was to complete the process of “Western” modernization based on 
government control over the economy. His most significant reform was the transformation of the 
transportation industry—the Trans Iranian Railway was built and created approximately 14,000 
miles of highway.123 This infrastructure allowed the growth of both a new Iranian army and a 
modern, bureaucratic state. Although Reza Shah’s reforms did have a significant effect on 
improving the economy and the standard of living, most of the public were ambivalent to his 
policies. 
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Muhammad Reza Shah, however, was known for his erratic economic policies from the 
beginning of his reign in 1941.  As early as 1943, Muhammad Reza Shah’s was attacked by 
those within the regime for financial extravagance and lavish expenditures.  His official 
economic policies began in 1947 when he launched the Five and Seven Year Development 
Plans, but they proved to be unsuccessful. Inflation increased, foreign currency reserves were 
depleted, and agrarian reforms were not even addressed. By the 1950s and 1960s two economic 
issues defined his rule—the nationalization of foreign oil companies and the implementation of 
the White Revolution Program. 
4.3.1 The Nationalization of Oil 
In 1947 Mossadegh raised the issue of nationalization of oil policy when he created and chaired 
the Majles’ (Parliament) Oil Committee to protest the latest oil agreement between the Shah and 
the British controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) (Milani 72).  Mossadegh’s objections 
against the AIOC were extensive, but focused on the evident inequities of the agreement; his 
primary grievance was the unequal distribution of profits. While the AIOC had made over 200 
million pounds by 1933, Iran had only received under 10 million pounds of the profit, while 28 
million pounds went directly to the British Treasury.124 When Mossadegh was named Prime 
Minister in 1951, he immediately took an “oil-less” stance on economic policy. He realized the 
struggle over the nationalization of oil would not come to a quick end and therefore, decided to 
restructure the Iranian economy independent of its oil profits. He announced to the Parliament in 
late 1951: 
“We should assume that like Afghanistan and the European countries we do not 
have oil, we should reduce our spending and increase our revenues, the nation 
  74 
should tolerate [the burden of hard times] in order to free itself from the yoke of 
slavery.”125 
By the spring of 1952, the oil-less economy was the official economic policy of the Mossadegh 
regime. Although it did diversify Iran’s trade, it did nothing to stabilize or stimulate Iran’s 
economy. 
During his reign as Prime Minister, from April 1951 to August 1953, Mossadegh 
nationalized the oil industry, established the National Iranian Oil Company, and fostered the 
development of the bazaar class and the national bourgeoisie. He also implemented successful 
land reform policies that helped the agricultural sector—Mossadegh forced landlords to increase 
their financial contributions to the villages they owned by 10 to 20 percent and outlawed the use 
of labor without pay, a traditional practice in rural Iran.126 Mossadegh also nationalized the bus 
and telephone companies and even opened new bakeries to reduce food prices. Moreover, he 
created an import substitution sector to stop Iran’s need for Western made products. Although 
Mossadegh’s economic policies were effective, they could not make up for the loss of oil 
revenues that occurred during the attempt to nationalize Iranian oil. The support he had from the 
bazaaris, the urban poor, and the middle class was not enough to defend him from the political 
opposition—which attacked him from both inside and outside the country. Mossadegh could not 
overcome the alliance between the United States and British and the royalists and pro-British 
factions within Iran. However, he stood by his ideology until his overthrow in 1953—sacrificing 
his political leadership for democracy and nationalism.  
After the overthrow of Mossadegh in 1953, the landlords, military, and royal court 
regained most of their economic power quickly. Then, Iran experienced rapid economic growth 
because of the resumption of oil revenues and the increase in foreign aid, both of which had been 
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stagnant under Mossadegh. Gross national product increased by 6 percent per year in the mid to 
late fifties and oil profits increased from 34.4 million in 1954 to 358.9 million in 1959 (Milani 
79). But this economic prosperity was short lived.  Beginning in the early 1960s, the government 
deficit and the subsequent public dissatisfaction with the economy undermined the Shah’s ability 
to rule. Income inequality rose rapidly—between 1959 and 1960 the top twenty percent of the 
population accounted for almost 52 percent of the income expenditures, while the lower forty 
percent represented only 13.9 percent. The dissatisfaction was widespread; Abrahamian observed 
that “The number of major strikes, which had totaled no more than three in 1955-1957, jumped 
to over twenty in 1957-1961…some ending in bloody confrontation between strikers and the 
armed forces.”127 In 1960 alone, there were more than one hundred separate strikes and 
demonstrations by students, workers, and even government employees.  The Shah realized 
something drastic needed to be done.  Therefore, by mid 1962 the Shah replaced Amini, Iran’s 
Prime Minister and champion of land reforms, and took personal responsibility for the 
socioeconomic reform initiatives, created the White Revolution. 
4.3.2 The White Revolution 
The White Revolution began with the Shah’s decree in November 1961 and was finally ratified 
by the Majles in January 1963. The six main points were: land reform, the sale of state owned 
enterprises to the public, women’s suffrage, the nationalization of forests, a profit sharing plan 
for industrial workers, and the establishment of a literacy corps. The Shah saw himself as the 
leader of a progressive reform movement, as a “revolutionary monarch, egalitarian and 
autocratic.”128  More importantly, he viewed the White Revolution as a way to gain legitimacy—
the reforms would cause the people to form a social and political alliance in support of their 
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monarch—unfortunately, the Shah’s vision of himself as a “revolutionary monarch” never 
materialized. 
Although some positive changes were made under the program, the White Revolution is 
deemed by scholars as intrinsically flawed—it created more social, political, and economic 
tension than improvements. For example, the focus of the program was land reform; however, 
most farmers received little or no land, villages were left without necessary amenities, and food 
prices favored the urban regions of the country—the White Revolution did not touch about half 
of Iran’s countryside.  Additionally, the rapid growth of the education system was a success in 
increasing literacy rates, but also created high unemployment for recent graduates. In 1966, high 
school graduates had a higher rate of unemployment then those Iranians who were illiterate. 
There was a lack of management for the industry and business sectors, which negatively affected 
Iran’s export capacity in the late 1960s. Finally, the social programs involved did improve health 
and other civic facilities, but after a decade Iran still boasted one of the world’s highest infant 
mortality rates and there were more Iranian trained doctors in New York, then there were in any 
city besides Tehran.  
After the first decade of the White Revolution, there is no doubt that Iran was struggling 
economically. Despite the explosive surge of oil prices in the 1970s, inflation and other problems 
created by the fast pace development, produced hardships for many Iranians.  For instance, the 
population increased rapidly, from 1970 to 1977 Tehran’s population alone increased by 2.5 
million. But the overall level of agricultural production could not keep up with the increasing 
demand for more and more food, sending many into dire poverty. The working class also 
suffered; 73% of all workers were making less than the legal minimum in 1976.129 And most 
detrimental, the gap between the rich and the poor continued to grow.  During the 1950s, Iran 
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was a country with one of the largest gaps between rich and poor; by the 1970s, it had one of 
very worst in the world, according to the International Labor Office. For instance, Central Bank 
surveys revealed in 1973-1974, the richest 10% accounted for 37.9% of total income 
expenditures while the poorest 10% only accounted for 1.3% of expenditures. Despite these vast 
inequality gaps, the Shah’s personal wealth in the late 1970s was estimated to be around 1 billion 
with the Pahlavi family assets totaled over 20 billion.130  Public unrest began to rise and protests 
against the reforms became more common—the Shah’s reform attempts were backfiring, 
galvanizing opposition to his regime.   
According to Professor Mohsen Milani, the White Revolution had three major flaws that 
contributed to its ultimate failure. First, it was unable to modernize Iran’s traditional society, 
creating dualism in the economy. The power of the industrial sector was rapidly increased, while 
the bazaaris and merchants also clung on to their previous power. Secondly, the program 
modernized the economy of the nation, but not the politics, which resulted in an uneven 
development. Finally, the program had no real support from the people or the government and 
lacked an overarching ideology, making the opposition against the Shah even stronger. The 
opposition, specifically Khomeini and his followers, used the White Revolution’s failure as a 
tool to mobilize the masses. Khomeini targeted his message to the disenfranchised. He reiterated 
slogans that eventually became the declarations heard during the Islamic Revolution. Some of 
these common phrases were,  
 “Islam belongs to the oppressed, not the oppressor”. 
 “Islam represents the slum-dwellers, not the palace dwellers”. 
“Islam is not the opiate of the masses, the poor die for the revolution, the rich plot 
against the Revolution” 
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“The duty of the clergy is to liberate the poor from the clutches of the rich”131 
These slogans were extremely effective in motivating the lower class to join the 
revolution. Khomeini had persistently denied that economic factors contributed to the overthrow 
of the Shah, commenting that “Iran’s Islamic Revolution was not about the price of melons.” But 
the contribution of economic grievances cannot be ignored—they did contribute to the 
revolution, along with other political and social factors.  According to Professor Ervand 
Abrahamian, “The White Revolution had been designed to preempt a Red Revolution. Instead, it 
paved the way for an Islamic Revolution.” 
However it is extremely important to understand that economic factors alone did not 
cause the revolution—it was the disparity between political, economic, and social growth that 
isolated various constituencies and united the opposition against the Shah. Again, Professor 
Abrahamian gives the most comprehensive explanation,  
“The revolution came because the Shah modernized on the socioeconomic level 
and thus expanded the ranks of the modern middle class and the industrial 
working class, but failed to modernize on another level—the political…this 
failure inevitably strained the links between the political structure and the social 
structure, blocked the channeling of social grievances between the political 
system and the general population, widened the gap between the ruling circles and 
new social forces, and most serious of all, cut down the few bridges that had in 
the past connected the political establishment with the traditional social forces, 
especially the bazaar and the religious authorities…In short, the revolution took 
place neither because of  overdevelopment nor because of underdevelopment, but 
because of uneven development.”132 
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4.4 ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES—GREEN MOVEMENT 2009 
Despite the emphasis of Khomeini’s revolutionary rhetoric on the equal distribution of wealth 
and improving social justice, Iran’s economy is no better today than it was during the Shah’s 
reign.  In fact,  most of Iran’s economic problems—overused subsidies, a large bureaucracy, an 
inefficient state sector, and widespread corruption—are a direct result of the Islamic Republic’s 
policies and have led to massive unemployment, rising inflation, and extreme division between 
the rich and the poor. After almost thirty years of egalitarian social policies in post revolutionary 
Iran, income inequality has not seen a significant change. 
All aspects of the Iranian economy had declined in the first few years following the 
revolution, mostly because of the cost of the war with Iraq; but the oil industry was the most 
effected of all the economic sectors. For instance, Iran produced over 6 million barrels of oil per 
day in the Shah’s final years, but by 1980 production fell to 1.5 million barrels a day.133  
Additionally, in order to manage economic hardships during the war, basic food, medical goods, 
petroleum products were all subsidized and rationing began in 1980 after Iraq’s invasion of Iran.  
During the eight years of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1989), the Iranian economy continually 
worsened, per capita gross domestic product severely decreased and inflation accelerated rapidly. 
By the mid 1980s, The Islamic Republic’s conception of social justice was failing—a report by 
Iran’s own Planning and Budget Organization stated that “absolute poverty” rose 45 percent 
from 1979 to 1985.134 By 1988, when the cease-fire finally occurred, Iran’s economic 
infrastructure was in ruins—urban poverty doubled, per capita income decreased 45 percent, 
massive inflation continued to grow, productivity was at a record low, per capita GDP had 
decreased to half its pre revolution peak reached in 1976,  and the country had suffered over one 
million casualties.135 
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4.4.1 Rafsanjani’s Presidency 
Khomeini’s death in 1989 and the election of the new President, Rafsanjani, represented a 
significant transformation in the regime’s economic policies—Iran was entering “a self 
proclaimed era of reconstruction.”136  Damages from the war had totaled around 1 trillion dollars 
and Rafsanjani portrayed the liberalization of the economy and interaction with the international 
community as essential to fostering economic growth. His economic reforms involved: 
infrastructure expansion, the privatization of state enterprises, the reduction of subsidies, the 
creation of free trade regions, and foreign exchange liberalization (Maloney, Wright, 96). During 
1990 and1992 Iran experienced a period of rapid economic growth in which poverty decreased—
the boom of oil profits lifted those at the bottom of society up very quickly. However, by 1993, 
Iran had massive external debt resulting from the undertaking of foreign loans and the printing of 
large quantities of money; this sent the country into a recession for the next two years. Iran’s 
economic growth remained relatively low during most of the 1990s. Rafsanjani’s economic 
reforms, especially during his second term, were constantly criticized by the Parliament and 
other branches of the regime.  Many Islamic leftists viewed the acceptance of free market 
liberalization as compromising the revolution’s ideology, making it extremely difficult for 
Rafsanjani to enact market based reforms. 
When Khatami was elected president in1997, the country still faced economic hardships 
such as rising inflation and unemployment. During his two terms in office, he achieved moderate 
economic improvements, but as with Rafsanjani, some of his policies were blocked by 
conservatives in different branches of the government. However, Khatami did accomplish the 
following during his presidency: he unified the exchange rate, created the first private banks, 
increased Western investment, authorized the Oil Stabilization Fund as a backup in case of 
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economic crisis, and liberalized the regulations regarding foreign investment (Maloney, Wright 
97). Despite moderate gains, by January 2003, unemployment rose to 16 percent. In February 
2003, a study leaked from the Ministry of the Interior estimated that 28 percent of the Iranian 
population wanted “fundamental changes in the regime’s structure” and 66 percent wanted 
gradual economic reforms.137  When the 2005 presidential elections began, the economy was the 
central focus of debate. 
4.4.2 The Iranian Economy after 2005 
Because the 2005 presidential election was centered on economic issues related to poverty and 
inequality, Ahmadinejad capitalized on the issue and vowed to decrease poverty, fight 
corruption, and to “bring the oil money to people’s dinner tables.”138  However, in the aftermath 
of his election, Ahmadinejad did not take advantage of the rising price of oil and ignored the 
underlying problems that affected Iran’s economy. Instead, he raised the Revolutionary Guards 
retirement funds, expanded the government’s credit spending, disbanded the planning 
bureaucracy and dismissed government technocrats. Leading political leaders and economists, 
both outside and inside Iran, condemned Ahmadinjad’s economic policies, deeming them 
“interventionist” and “spending based.”139 Under Ahmadinejad’s reign, economic development 
was stifled and the government was forced to face increasing fiscal pressure and dissatisfaction 
from the public. 
The most prominent economic grievance was unemployment—in 2005 it was still 12 
percent and the number of young people entering the work force had increased by four fifths, the 
highest it had ever been. Additionally, even those who did have jobs could not afford the cost of 
living in urban areas. In 2005, Iran had one of the highest urban housing costs relative to 
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incomes in the world—the average cost of a house in 2005 was ten times the average annual 
salary. As a result, the number of men and women who live with their parents rose from 50 
percent in 1984 to 75 percent in 2005. The younger and immigrant populations could not afford 
urban living on the salaries they were being given.  Although the level of abject poverty was 
relatively low, the distribution of wealth was extremely unequal—in 2006, the ten percent of 
Iranians with the highest incomes represented 45 percent of the total consumption. This meant 
that 10 percent of the population controls 76 percent of Iran’s total resources.140 
The lack of economic opportunities led to major “brain drain”—between 150,000 and 
200,000 Iranians left the country each year in 2005, one of the highest rates in the world 
accordingly to the IMF.141 Iranian economist Fariborz Raisdana said in 2005, “We cannot offer 
them [the youth] opportunities in the fields of politics, economics, or science. So they simply 
move on.”142  Those young Iranians who don’t leave the country, had a very limited chance of 
acquiring a job that carried a salary ample enough to support themselves, not to mention their 
families. One student commented in June 2005, “It really doesn’t matter what your graduation 
grade is, it makes no difference what contacts you have. You just cannot find a decent job.”143  
By late 2008, inflation rates soared above 30 percent and unemployment remained in the 
double digits. Public frustration, especially amongst the disillusioned youth, was at an all time 
high. Ahmadinejad tried to appease the population by declaring that even if oil prices dropped to 
5 dollars a barrel, Iran’s economy would remain stable—a completely illogical assertion. As the 
2009 presidential elections approached, the economy became the dominant issue in the campaign 
again.  
Just weeks before the election, unemployment hovered around 17 percent and there were 
no improvements in the level of inflation. In the nationally televised debates, Ahmadinejad 
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continued to insist that the Iranian economy was secure and strong—he held up several graphs 
demonstrating how the Iranian economy was prospering as a recession hit the rest of the Western 
world.  The other presidential candidate in one particular debate, Mehdi Karrubi, angrily replied 
to Ahmadinejad’s comments, “Do you think I came from the desert, and that I don’t know 
anything about figures?”144   He went on to criticize Ahmadinejad’s economic policies over the 
past few years and accused him of fabricating the figures he had just shown to the Iranian people. 
Ahmadinejad’s outlandish observations about the Iranian economy infuriated a large majority of 
the population, who was struggling to find a well paid job. His comments further solidified 
reform support and incited more of the public to vote for Mousavi on June 12th, 2009. Supporters 
of reform in Iran could no longer stomach Ahmadinejad’s economic ineptitudes—policies that 
consistently inflicted hardships on the Iranian people. Therefore, when Ahmadinejad was named 
the winner, hundreds of thousands of protestors rushed the streets to demonstrate their 
dissatisfaction with the government for its continual mismanagement of the Iranian economy. 
When protestors held up signs that read “Where is my vote?”, they were demanding the Islamic 
regime be accountable, for the alleged election fraud and for the myriad of economic blunders 
committed during the presidency of Ahmadinejad. 
  84 
5.0  THE THIRD VARIABLE—STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSITION  
5.1 1979 
The most important factor that led to the success of the 1979 Islamic Revolution was the 
participation of a massive popular base that represented a significant cross section of Iran’s 
social, economic, and political strata.  For instance, on September 4, 1978, the Iranian religious 
holiday of Aid-Fetr demonstrations took place in every major city. Upwards of 100,000 people 
protested in Shahyad Square in Tehran. But the most astonishing aspect of the protests was not 
the number of people, but the diversity of social classes. One foreign journalist from Time 
Magazine commented, “the vast crowd contained incongruous elements: dissident students in 
jeans, traditional women in chadors, workers in overalls, merchants in suits, and most 
conspicuous of all, bearded mullas in black robes.”145  Three days later the protesting crowd 
grew to more than half a million. Finally, by December 11, 1978, approximately one-fifth of the 
entire Iranian population, 8 million people, demonstrated against the Shah in one day.146  How 
did the opposition to the Shah engender such mass participation from all aspects of Iranian 
society?  The movement had three crucial characteristics that galvanized the population and 
subsequently led to its success—effective opposition organizations, capable leadership, and a 
unifying goal. 
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5.1.1 Opposition Organizations 
One of the most prominent reasons the Shah and his military could not suppress the Islamic 
Revolution was because the opposition was formidable, diverse, and effective. The 25 years of 
repression under the Shah created opposition organizations from all levels of society. Three types 
of organized opposition—political parties, radical guerrilla organizations, and clerical groups—
dominated the revolutionary movement and represented all social and political strata of Iranian 
society. 
5.1.1.1 Political Parties 
Despite harsh government controls, a myriad of political parties continued to flourish under the 
Shah. The most prominent and influential were the National Front, the Liberation Movement, 
and the Tudeh (Communist) Party. The National Front, which was founded by former Prime 
Minister Mossadegh, was severely repressed after the 1953 coup.  However, it resurfaced in the 
midst of the 1963 uprisings and officially reemerged in December 1977 in staunch opposition to 
the Shah. Karim Sanjabi, the party’s new leader, announced the basic principles of the 
organization included, “independence from all chains of imperialism, personal and social 
freedoms, and an independent foreign policy.”147  Even though the party had been politically 
inactive for some time, it engaged sympathizers from its former base—the middle class and the 
intellectual community—by organizing rallies, publishing oppositional newspapers, and inciting 
demonstrations on university campuses. Most importantly, in the fall of 1978 the National Front 
created a wave of anti-shah momentum when they refused to cooperate with the government on 
reforms and instead publicly allied with Khomeini. This political alliance brought many middle 
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class members and secular intellectuals into the opposition movement and solidified their 
opposition to the Shah. 
Another prominent party, the Tudeh, rapidly declined after the 1953 coup, mostly due to 
the regime’s concentrated efforts to destroy the organization. Immediately after the overthrow of 
Mossadegh, 40 Tudeh advocates were executed, 200 received life in prison sentences, and 14 
were killed during torture; comparatively, only 1 National Front activist was executed and the 
others had been given short prison sentences. The Tudeh’s influence continued to decline in the 
next two decades, but by the early 1970s the party had regained its influence and even began to 
attract new, young members with the help of its headquarters abroad. Still illegal in Iran, the 
Tudeh had around 50 full time party workers in exile—the group organized rallies, created a 
radio station, and also established an anti-Shah organization called the Confederation of Iranian 
Students in Europe. Most importantly the party published two papers—Mardom(People), a 
regular newspaper, and Donya (World), a journal focused on political and social theory—that 
were distributed abroad and clandestinely inside Iran.148 Additionally, the Tudeh had around 
5,000 members in Iran located in underground cells in universities, industrial centers, and oil 
regions across Iran. The Tudeh, along with these activists, were able to organize an annual strike 
on national student day, December 7th, to commemorate the three students (two of which were 
members of the Tudeh Party) that were killed during protests in 1953. The event became a 
significant symbol of the opposition and brought hundreds of thousands of Iranians together in 
1978 to protest the Shah’s rule.  
The final party, the Liberation Movement, had the most influence in the making of the 
Islamic Revolution because of its close ties with Khomeini. The party was officially banned in 
1963, but continued to hold meetings in secret in Iran and created a wide base in North America 
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and France. Overseas the party recruited thousands of members and effectively helped Khomeini 
present himself as an appealing and moderate cleric to the Western press. Inside Iran, the 
Liberation Movement faced harsh oppression, but used its hardships to show the international 
community Iran’s blatant violation of human rights. The party proudly declared, “We are 
Muslims, Iranians and constitutionalists: Muslims because we refuse to divorce our principles 
from our politics; Iranians because we respect our national heritage; and constitutionalists 
because we demand freedom of thought, expression, and association.”149 The party’s main 
source of mobilization was the mosque; they encouraged the religious to join the cause against 
the Shah. Mehdi Bazargan, the party’s leader, was even more knowledgeable than some of the 
clerics on Shia Islamic Law and he used this skill to engage the masses; he incited traditional 
Iranians to protest against the Shah and be loyal to Khomeini.  Consequently, after the Shah was 
overthrown, Liberation Movement members received the leading positions in the first 
provisional government headed by Mehdi Bazargan.  
Without these political parties a large portion of the Iranian population, especially the 
middle class and secular intellectuals, would not have been mobilized. Even Khomeini noted the 
significance of official political parties becoming heavily involved in the opposition. In 
September 1977 he praised them and wrote to the alumna, “Today in Iran, a break is in sight; 
take advantage of this opportunity…Today, the writers of political parties criticize and voice 
their opposition; they write letters to the Shah and to the ruling class and sign those letter. You, 
too, should write the same.”150 The presence of political parties is a compelling causal factor in 
the development of the Islamic Revolution. 
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5.1.1.2 Radical Guerrilla Organizations 
There were about a dozen guerrilla organizations operating in Iran during the 1960s and 
1970s, but the two organizations that had the largest impact on the revolution were the Fadiman 
and the Mujahidin. Both attracted young students and intellectuals and the organizations never 
had a lack of enthusiastic supporters—their “apocalyptic overtones and powerful utopian 
tendencies” were appealing to impatient minds. Their tactics were extremely effective, shaming 
the regime the claimed to be the most stable and powerful in the Middle East—the Fadiman and 
the Mujahidin had a substantial role in the overthrow of the Shah.151 
The Fadiman was established in 1971 as the combination of two separate Marxist 
organizations. Similar to the Tide, the organization followed a Marxist-Leninist ideology, but 
emphasized guerrilla warfare.  Secular students and intellectuals frustrated with their political 
parties were attracted to the organization and inspired by the effective use of guerrilla tactics in 
Cuba, China, Vietnam, and part of Latin America.  Despite the Shah’s campaign to eliminate the 
organization, the Fadiman expanded quickly. It published and distributed a myriad of 
underground papers, actively recruited members, established hundreds of safe houses in Iran’s 
major cities, and even executed several armed military operations against the monarchy. The 
strength of the Fadiman was that its members were all well trained, extremely dedicated, and 
armed—they were willing to do anything to abolish the monarchy.  
The other guerrilla organization, the Mujahidin, was established in 1965 by disillusioned 
members of the Liberation Movement and made armed struggle their main approach to destroy 
the Shah’s regime. The organization professed, “It was the duty of all Muslims to continue this 
struggle to create a classless society and destroy all forms capitalism, despotism, imperialism and 
conservative clericalism.”152  They viewed Islam as the mechanism to engender the masses 
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against the Shah and recruited members of the urban poor to take up arms. The Mojadedin 
committed 6 bank robberies, bombed several foreign businesses, and assassinated prominent 
members of the regime, including Tehran’s police chief.153  Although the group was heavily 
persecuted and had internal division, when the revolutionary upsurge started in 1977 it had a vast 
network of trained members with readily available weapons and the desire to fight the regime. In 
fact, during the violent confrontations that took place during February 9-11, 1979, it was the 
Mojahedin and the Fadaiyan who forced the collapse of the Shah’s army and completed the 
official victory of the revolution. Therefore, the contribution of the guerrilla organizations in the 
revolution was truly indispensible. 
5.1.1.3 Clerical Groups 
The relationship between the clergy and the state began to decline in the early 1960s when the 
Shah introduced land reform—something most religious leaders opposed because it would 
diminish the property owned by mosques and individual clerics. Many religious leaders also 
found the Shah’s modernization policies to be morally reprehensible and incompatible with 
Islamic Law. However, it is essential to note that the Iranian clergy were not a uniform social 
class—during the time of the revolution up until present day, the clergy ardently disagree on 
principles of Islamic Law and how (or even if) these should be applied to the state. But the 
Shah’s repression of religion, rapid modernization policies, and land reform proposals acted as a 
unifier for the different elements of the clergy. Still, scholars divide the clerical opponents into 
three distinct groups: the apolitical ulama, the moderate clerical opposition, and the militant 
clerical opposition. 
The apolitical ulama, estimated to be the largest group, believed that clergy should focus 
strictly on spiritual matters and stay completely out of politics. They were eventually forced to 
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take a political stance against the Shah in the late 1970s when religious establishment began 
being attacked by the regime. The moderate clerical opposition opposed the regime’s policies, 
but did not call for its overthrow. They promoted compromise with the Shah and supported the 
reemergence of a true constitutional monarchy.  The moderate clerics, like the apolitical ones, 
could not stay neutral after the Shah’s assault on the Iranian religious community. Finally, the 
militant clerical opposition, spearheaded by Khomeini, promoted a complete removal of the 
monarchy and more importantly, the formation of an Islamic state. Their political theory and 
principles stem directly from Khomeini work Vela at e Faith: Hukomat e Islami (The Jurist 
Trusteeship: Islamic Government), which maintains sovereignty comes only from God.  The 
militant clerical group also constantly criticized the former two clerical groups for being 
politically inactive, accepting of secularization, and acting as “imperialists.”154 Despite their 
differences, the clerical opposition groups unified in support of Khomeini during the final days 
of the revolution.  
The religious leadership, which numbered well over 90,000, used Iran’s mosques to 
educate and mobilize the Iranian people against the Shah. This process began after the uprisings 
in 1963, but rapidly increased in the mid to late 1970s.  The mosque acted as the revolutionary 
headquarters—it was a safe space that the Shah could not shut down and provided a constant 
source of human and financial resources. In the mosque, religious leaders gave anti-Shah 
speeches, opposition forces organized strikes and rallies, citizens produced opposition material, 
and Iranians were recruited for mass demonstrations.  By 1978, mosques were receiving 
enormous amounts of funding from bazaar merchants and the religious upper class that was used 
to develop and finance the revolution. Islamic komitehs (committees) responsible for gathering 
supporters and promoting the Islamic revolutionary message were established in every 
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neighborhood in Tehran.  The Islamic network set off the first Qum protests and organized the 
Ramazan and Muharram demonstrations, where over 8 million Iranians gathered to protest 
against the Shah in 1978. As Zahedi puts it, “the mullahs could virtually command the 
people…clearly the religious establishment served as the most formidable mobilization force in 
the country.”155 Without the participation of the Islamic network—which includes all three of the 
clerical opposition groups—the Islamic Revolution would not have been successful.  
In conclusion, without these political parties, clerical groups, and guerrilla organizations 
the Islamic Revolution would not have occurred. According to Professor John Foran, out of this 
diverse opposition came,  
“…the ideas that would mobilize millions of Iranians in 1977-1979: nationalism, 
democracy, socialism, Islamic fundamentalism, radicalism, and liberalism all 
appealed in sometime complex and overlapping fashion to the various 
constituencies—young ulama, merchants, students, artisans, intellectuals, urban 
marginals—that would loosely coalesce into an urban populist social movement. 
Without these orientations it is hard to see the shape that a revolutionary 
movement could have taken; their presence then is a significant causal factor in 
the making of the revolution.”156  
5.1.2 The Charismatic Leader—Khomeini  
Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini was born in 1902 to a family of landowners, traders, and minor 
clerics. After the death of his father, he was raised by his mother’s family, most of whom where 
religious clerics. Khomeini studied in various religious institutions in Qom, Esfahan, and Arak 
and eventually became a teacher of Islam Law in Qom. He published his first political work in 
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1943, Kashf al Asrar (Secrets Unveiled), which advocated the establishment of an Islamic 
government; however, he did not become active and well known in Iranian political until 1963. 
Khomeini began to criticize the government in late 1962; he condemned the Shah’s land reform 
program and denounced the regime for its corruption, violation of the constitution, undermining 
of the nation’s Islamic principles, manipulation of the election system, oppression of the poor, 
and censorship of the media. Khomeini’s outspoken defamation of the regime led to the three 
days of protests in June 1961, during which thousands died or were injured in major cities all 
over the country. In the months after the violent demonstrations, Khomeini was repeatedly 
arrested and finally exiled by the Shah. 
Even in exile, Khomeini constantly communicated with his supporters in Iran via written 
and recorded sermons, speeches, and declarations. For the first six years of his exile, he focused 
on teaching Islamic jurisprudence and preparing academic works.  But in early 1970, Khomeini 
shocked the clergy and the rest of the Iranian public with a series of 17 lectures condemning the 
apolitical and moderate ulama and officially denouncing the monarchy as an institution. These 
lectures eventually became entitled Velayat e Faqih: Hukomati e Islami (The Jurist’s 
Trusteeship: Islamic Government). In the lectures, Khomeini adamantly asserted that 
compromise would not be successful with the Shah—Shi’ism and the institution of the monarchy 
would never be compatible. Khomeini’s declaration made him the first religious leader to 
demand the overthrow of the Shah.  Consequently, the release of these lectures automatically 
placed Khomeini in the forefront of the anti-Shah movement—it buttressed his position as the 
most outspoken member of the opposition and also gave religious legitimacy to dissent against 
the Pahlavi monarchy. Throughout the 1970s, Khomeini continued to activate a religious 
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political culture of opposition and began to develop his plan for the implementation of an Islamic 
state.  
 Khomeini first targeted the lower and working class Iranians and encouraged them to 
join the opposition movement. He described Iranian society as made up of just two opposing 
classes: the oppressed (mostazafin) and the oppressors (mostakberin) and vowed to eliminate 
these strata from the system. Furthermore, he promised to create an Islamic utopia free of 
worldly injustice, corruption, inequality, political repression, and crime.  He professed, “The 
Islamic Revolution will do more than liberate us from oppression and imperialism. It will create 
a new type of human being.”157 Khomeini also related to the public by addressing them as “the 
aware, the dear and courageous nation”, “the oppressed of Iran”, “the Iranian Muslim people”, 
and “children of the revolution”—evoking intense nationalistic sentiments. Khomeini 
commented on his own appeal to Iranians, “The symbol of the struggle is the one who talks with 
the people…That’s why the Iranian people consider me a symbol. I talk their language. I listen to 
their needs. I cry for them.”158 His disciples reiterated this image by portraying him as an ideal 
“man of the people”, who lived simply, just like the rest of the Iranian people.  
Khomeini’s tremendous charismatic and popular allure, combined with his simple living 
style and religious legitimacy, enabled him to act as a unifier for the opposition movement. 
Using populist rhetoric to engage the masses, he convinced Iranians the only way to stop the 
regime’s repression was by overthrowing the monarchy.  Moreover, Khomeini realized that to do 
this, the opposition needed to be undivided. Therefore, he specifically propagated a “unity of 
purpose”, never committing himself to a specific policy or program or affiliating with a certain 
political party. In fact, during the revolution he never even publicized his philosophy of velayat e 
faqih; even some of his closest followers were ignorant of its true, political implications.  
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By October 1978, Khomeini was forced to leave Iraq and eventually settled in France 
after several Arab countries denied him entrance. Khomeini’s expulsion from Iraq triggered three 
days of protests—government ministries, hospital employees, postal service workers, taxi 
drivers, railroad employees, and Iran Air all went on strike to support Khomeini. In the meantime 
Khomeini was issuing a constant flow of interviews, declarations, and sermons—by the 
beginning of 1979 he was making daily declarations and giving press interviews whenever 
possible.  His followers used the mosque networks to recruit and mobilize new opponents, most 
of which were lower class bazaaris who were drawn to Khomeini’s magnetism and his ability to 
articulate his message in simple terms.159 Finally, at the end of January in 1979 Khomeini 
completed his goal of unifying the opposition—both the Tudeh and the National Front openly 
announced their support for Khomeini and vehemently called for the overthrow of the Shah.  
Violent demonstrations continued and the regime used brutal means to repress the 
opposition; however, the revolutionary movement could not be stopped. The Shah and his family 
left Iran on January 16th and hundreds of thousands immediately cried out for the return of 
Khomeini. In late January over 30 people were killed protesting the closing of the Tehran airport 
to prevent Khomeini’s arrival back to Iran. Then, on February 1st approximately 3 to 4 million 
Iranians (possibly the largest human gathering to date) lined the street of Tehran all the way to 
the airport to celebrate Khomeini’s return.  Without a charismatic leader to unify the Iranian 
opposition and the public, the revolution would not have materialized. Ervand Abrahamian, one 
of the foremost scholars of Iran, emphasizes the importance of Khomeini’s role in the 
development of the Islamic Revolution. He says, “Without Khomeinism there would have been 
no revolution—at least, not the Islamic Revolution.”160 
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5.1.3 Unifying Goal 
During the revolution there was a diverse array of political ideologies—including liberal 
democrats, Islamic leftists, Marxist and socialist guerrilla groups, secular constitutionalists, and 
many more.  Although each opposition group had its own distinct credos, they also had a 
unifying goal—to put a stop to the political, economic, and social repression imposed by the 
Shah. By 1978, it was clear structural government changes would not improve conditions—the 
removal of the Shah was necessary. Therefore the cooperation between opposition groups began 
as a reaction to regime oppression—the government’s actions were the primary mobilizing force 
of the revolutionary movement; they affected every political and economic strata of Iranian 
society. 
The best example of this “unifying effect” is the case of the Iranian liberal opposition, 
who originally vehemently opposed revolution. The liberals were the party with the most access 
and representation in the regime compared to other opponents—but in the 1970s they failed to 
make any real changes. In 1978, the liberal movement realized the opposition was much larger 
than they had anticipated and were surprised with the amount of participation Khomeini and his 
followers attained. In the next months, the liberals joined the revolutionary movement, not 
because their ideology changed, but because they felt it was too strong to counter. In fact, one 
prominent liberal activist accused Khomeini in November 1978 of “irresponsibility and acting 
like a false god” but also commented he or his fellow oppositionists would never criticize 
Khomeini publicly.161  
This unity of purpose was also felt among everyday citizens who participated in the 
revolution. They were personally affected by the Shah’s oppressive policies and were committed 
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to doing anything to stop him. For instance, acts of repression that affected individuals created 
intense revolutionary zeal. One anthropologist observed,  
“People felt this emotion and gained this attitude through hearing about or 
participating in events in which government forces treated people with violence 
and injustice…Villagers reported to me their fury, horror, and frustration upon 
hearing such events, as well as their resolve that they would never rest until the 
Shah and the government that did such things to their fellow Iranians no longer 
existed.”162 
These sentiments brought Iranians together, despite their class, professional, or even 
gender. As one participant in the 1978 protests put it, “It was not an individual decision. 
Everyone was of a piece. When everyone is of a piece, one person cannot stay separate.”163  
Without this unity, the cooperation between Iranian of different classes and political groups, the 
Shah would not have been overthrown in 1979. 
5.2 2009 
The Green Movement produced the most extensive protests since the Iranian Revolution of 
1979—at its height almost 3 million demonstrators turned out on the streets of Tehran. With so 
much support, why did no political change occur? The Green Movement had three essential 
weaknesses that led to its stagnation—its lack of effective political organizations, lack of 
cohesive leadership, and the absence of a unified platform for change. 
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5.2.1 Lack of Political Organizations 
After the Islamic regime consolidated power in the early 1980s, almost all political parties in 
opposition to the government were officially banned or harshly oppressed and persecuted.  The 
only political views that were officially represented were Islamic ones—factions of the 
government were split into leftists, conservatives, ultra conservatives, reformists, and other 
various Islamic ideologies. But no one Islamic political faction ever dominated the system—and 
this was no coincidence. In fact, it was a calculated political strategy employed by Khomeini to 
assure that the structure of the Islamic Republic would remain just as he created it.  Khomeini 
intentionally vacillated his views on major political issues to secure the regime’s stability. As 
one Member of Parliament commented after Khomeini’s death, 
“In all stages and through different means the Imam tried to keep the wings 
[factions] in balance and use the executive, ideological, populist or political 
power and efficacy of each wing for the benefit of the state. He tried to preserve 
this balance in order to keep one wing from becoming too powerful, and every 
time he felt that one was aiming to monopolize power he would put his weight 
behind others to keep the [balance of] power intact.”164 
Khomeini’s strategy was extremely effective and still permeates Iranian politics today. Even 
progressive factions within the regime have no real power to make significant changes.  Many 
powerful politicians like Ayatollahs Montazeri and Rafsanjani vehemently disagreed with the 
government’s response to the 2009 protests, but could do nothing to foster the impact of the 
Green Movement on the regime. 
Although all of the political parties that were active during the 1979 revolution still 
existed in 2009, they were either operating in exile or in clandestine, underground organizations 
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within Iran. Therefore, the Green Movement had no effective way to mobilize resources or 
opponents to the government, at least inside Iran—it had no hierarchical structure. Without a pre 
existing network of opposition supporters to call to action, the Green Movement had to rely on 
social networking sites to galvanize followers. This tactic worked until the Iranian government 
slowed the internet speed of all computers nationwide and completely denied access to sites like 
Facebook and Twitter. Another problem that stems from lack of political parties is that diverse 
strata of society are not represented. For instance, in the 1979 Revolution, oil workers and other 
laborers played a huge role by striking—their actions were the breaking point of the Shah’s 
regime. In 2009, however, workers had no political or social representation. The Green 
Movement could not reach out to a class of Iranians that could have helped them tremendously in 
its opposition to the regime.   
Furthermore, without political organizations, there was no unifying ideology or credo that 
brought the protestors together. The opposition “came together as a movement, a politically 
minded collection of individuals united around a conspiracy theory, rather than a party united by 
a political theory”. The lack of cogent political parties severely hindered the Green Movement, 
but the lack of cohesive leadership was an even larger weakness of the movement. 
5.2.2 Absence of Leadership 
The Green Movement received its name from a green sash that reform leader Mohammad 
Khatami gave to presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi in 2009. During the last weeks of 
the presidential campaign, Mousavi drew enthusiastic crowds of hundreds of thousands and 
created a vast community of supporters.  He became a symbol of hope and reform to many 
Iranians who thought his election could bring change to the Iranian system. But when 
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Ahmadinejad claimed the election, Mousavi spoke out against the regime and encouraged his 
supporters to demonstrate their frustrations through nonviolent protests. Thousands of 
demonstrators glorified Mousavi, yelling "Ya Hossein, Mir Hossein” and continually looked to 
him for guidance and direction—Iranians viewed him as the most prominent symbol of the 
Green Movement.  Despite Mousavi’s image as the founder and head of the Green movement, 
there was no centralized, charismatic leadership during the protests of 2009.  Iranian political 
activist Ali Afshari reiterated this perspective when he commented that Mousavi, “Grew into his 
role as the face of the opposition, but even he admits that he was an ‘accidental leader’ who was 
not guiding the protest movement.”165  
At first, Mousavi seemed to enthusiastically accept the role as the leader of the movement 
and came out fervently against the government. On his website, he said, 
“I’m warning that I won’t surrender to this manipulation. The outcome of what 
we’ve seen from the performance of the officials….is nothing but shaking the 
pillars of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s sacred system of governance with lies and 
dictatorship.”166 
And Mousavi backed these statements with action—on the third day of protests after the 
election, Mousavi appeared dressed in all green to a rally in Freedom Square, Tehran. He stood 
on top of a car, with thousands of people around him and encouraged the people to take back 
their rights; he yelled, “The vote of the people in more important than Mousavi or any other 
person!”167 The day after Ayatollah Khamenei announced unrest would not be tolerated, June 
13th, 2009, Mousavi and most of his campaign leaders were officially put on house arrest. But 
Mousavi comforted the followers of the Green Movement, saying, “Rest assured that I will 
always be at your side.”168 He continued to release statements and encourage the protestors, but 
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the government shut down all of his networking sites and was closely monitoring his home.  
With this type of security, it was extremely difficult for him to communicate with members of 
the movement.   
Mousavi’s gradual decline as the leader of the Green Movement coincided with his house 
arrest and the increase of revolutionary rhetoric in his approach.  He began to describe important 
protests as “showing the roots of the revolutionary spirit” and emphasized that reforms should 
work with the original Islamic constitution. He also refused to publicly criticize Khamenei and 
refused to establish a position on the velayat e faqih. Mousavi’s conciliatory actions toward the 
regime worried more progressive and youthful members of the Green Movement that maybe he 
no longer symbolized the movement’s views. Additionally, Mousavi began to stress the role of 
Iranians as the true leaders of the movement. Comments like, “you the Iranian nation, continue 
your nationwide protest in a peaceful and legal way” and “it is the people who are the leaders” 
forced followers to realize that Mousavi was unwilling to become the central leader of the Green 
Movement.169 Ironically, during this period, the Green Movement’s greatest unifying force 
became its opposition—President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Khamenei. Their hostile 
words and actions provided the opposition with a common cause and the strength that came with 
millions of supporters. Mousavi continued to be the symbol of the Green movement, despite his 
inability to appear publicly.  However, one of the primary reasons the movement stagnated in the 
fall of 2009 was because of its lack of charismatic, centralized leadership. 
5.2.3 No Unified Platform 
Another weakness of the Green Movement was its lack of a cogent and unified platform for 
change. The movement began as a reaction to the alleged election fraud, but spread to encompass 
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aspirations for a more democratic and free Iran. Therefore, some of its members simply wanted a 
new election, while others called for the resignation of the Islamic regime altogether. Various 
leaders of the movement called for different demands, but there were no official ideological or 
practical goals the movement followed. Therefore, it was extremely hard for the movement to 
attract new supporters and maintain current members without a clearly defined objective. Reform 
leaders both inside and outside Iran recognized this problem, and began to address it in the 
beginning of 2010. 
On January 3rd, 2010, Abdolkarim Soroush, Islamic scholar and reform movement leader, 
published a manifesto of the Green Movement’s demands. Soroush, who was in exile in the 
United States insisted, “if there is going to be another movement, it has to have a theory. People 
should know what they want, not just what they don’t want. So we are trying—in a modest 
way—to put forward a theory for this movement.”170 Coordinating with some of the leaders of 
the Green Movement like Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami, Soroush created the manifesto that 
calls for an independent judiciary, government recognition of student and women’s groups, 
freedom of the press, and many other democratic freedoms. Although the manifest was a positive 
step for the movement, it was drafted outside of Iran and was very difficult to spread among the 
Green Movement in Iran. Therefore, in June 2010, Mousavi proposed his own precise platform, 
calling it “the new covenant.”171 It insisted the government’s legitimacy be based on the will of 
the people and proclaimed the Green Movement demanded a rule of law be enforced. It went on 
to discuss the role of the state and foreign policy as well. Despite these efforts, this platform has 
not changed the organization of the Green Movement—none of the above reforms have even 
been initiated, much less accomplished and followers of the movement still have no clear goals 
to support. Without effective political organizations, strong leadership, and a cogent platform, 
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the Green Movement had a difficult time attracting followers from all classes in Iranian 
society—and this was the most important factor contributing to the success of the 1979 
Revolution. 
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SAVAK, the Iranian acronym for the National Intelligence and Security Organization (Sazeman-
e Ettla’at Va Amniyat-e Keshvar), was established in 1957 with the help of the CIA and 
MOSSAD and acted as the Shah’s primary mechanism to combat political opposition. At its 
height the organization had over half a million members and had virtually unlimited power—
SAVAK was viewed by the Iranian people as omnipotent and omnipresent throughout the 
country. Although SAVAK used harsh interrogation and torture methods on political opponents, 
it was most effective because of the fierce reputation that the regime created and perpetuated for 
SAVAK to instill fear in the Iranian public. 
SAVAK’s influence was not restricted to security—it controlled all labor and teacher 
unions in Iran, implemented the censorship of press, books, and films, and even infiltrated 
prominent political opposition groups. For instance, in the 1950s, SAVAK spent most of its 
energy finding and destroying underground Tudeh cells. In 1954, sixty active members were 
discovered and most were imprisoned, tortured, or executed. In the mid 1960s, the guerrilla 
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group Fadaiyan became the primary target—the campaign lasted for years and ended in the 
killing of over 106 of Fadaiyan’s leaders.172 Then, beginning in the 1970s, SAVAK took full 
control over the Ministries of Information, Culture and Art, Science and Higher Education, and 
the National Iranian Radio and Television Organization. 
With SAVAK’s extensive control of both political and social institutions and repression 
used throughout Iranian society, how did the revolutionary opposition result in an overthrow of 
the Shah? Why was the state unable to protect the monarchy? There are numerous explanations, 
but the most rational blames two specific weaknesses of the Pahlavi state—over centralization 
and inconsistent responses to the opposition protests.  
The Shah considered the Iranian military, SAVAK and the army in particular, his “chief 
pillars of support”—the relationship between the crown and the military was closely intertwined 
throughout his reign. Different branches of the military had overlapping responsibilities, 
rivalries, and no lateral communication with each other to prevent the possibility of political 
rivals or a military coup replacing the Shah.  SAVAK also operated under the personal command 
of the monarch. This system was extremely effective, but had one condition—in order to be 
successful it depended solely on a fully functioning Shah.173  The power over the military was 
controlled completely by the Shah himself—this resulted in the over centralization of the Pahlavi 
state. 
6.1.2 Failure of the Military State 
But by 1978 this approach was impossible to maintain because the Shah had not only lost control 
of the state, but was also sick with cancer. Without orders coming directly from the Shah, the 
military struggled to keep together.  Finally, when the Shah left the country in mid January 1979, 
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much of the military lost the desire to serve. For instance, the army was isolated and became 
easily demoralized at attacking peaceful crowds whose ideology was motivated by Islam. By the 
end of January 1979, it was estimated there were almost 1,000 defections a day—conscripts had 
no reason or will to fight.174 Without the Shah present, the military could not effectively defend 
the regime from the revolutionary opposition. 
The second, and most important, factor that contributed to the fall of the Shah’s regime 
was his vacillating policies against the opposition—he constantly wavered between concession 
and repression. Most of the time, the regime employed brutal tactics to suppress the opposition. 
For example, in an effort to stop Muharram protests in 1978, SAVAK created its own 
Underground Committee of Revenge—an organization that threatened intellectuals, kidnapped 
prominent opposition activists, and even bombed a handful of political offices. Members also 
dressed in civilian clothes to infiltrate the opposition. In one instance, SAVAK killed over 30 
people who were celebrating a religious holiday in the garden of a National Front politician. 
Moreover, police forces broke up protests using batons and other weapons, often severely 
injuring whoever was in their way—man, woman, or child.175  The military also held oil and 
other industry workers who were on strike at gunpoint and forced them to return to their posts or 
face death.  
However, once in a while the Shah would impose “liberation” policies where he 
allowed the opposition to gather and lifted political restrictions. For example, during one of the 
final protests in 1978, the regime compromised with the opposition to allow a peaceful protest 
where no violence would be used. Additionally, between January and August 1978, SAVAK’s 
harsh director was replaced by a more “liberal” General and numerous high ranking SAVAK 
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officials were demoted.  The constant oscillation only aided the opposition movement. 
Professor Kurzman describes the consequences of these policies,  
“The combination of concession and repression is said to have encouraged 
protestors while providing them with new reasons to protest. Because of this 
vacillation…the Iranian revolution grew from a small and sporadic movement 
into a massive and continuous upheaval. The implication is that a more one sided 
policy—either reform or crackdown—would have been more effective in stifling 
protests.”176  
The founders of the Islamic Revolution took this lesson in stride—from the beginning of 
its rule, the government never allowed the development of political opposition. 
 
6.2 2009 
After the overthrow of the monarchy, the Islamic Republic created the Ebrat Museum (meaning 
“example” or lesson”), which documented the torture of revolutionaries—the new government 
wanted to ensure that the Shah’s brutal tactics against the opposition were not forgotten.  
However, the Islamic Republic created new methods to eliminate dissent. Historians today 
discovered the Islamic regime’s tactics were more savage than the Shah’s. For example, 
Professor Abrahamian recounts, 
“Whereas less than 100 political prisoners had been executed between 1971 and 
1979, more than 7,900 were executed between 1981 and 1985…in the prison 
literature of the Pahlavi era, the recurring words had been ‘boredom’ and 
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‘monotony’. In that of the Islamic Republic¸ they were ‘fear’, ‘death’, ‘terror’, 
‘horror’ and most frequent of all, ‘nightmare.’177 
The two military organizations that enforced these harsh attacks against opponents, both 
immediately after the revolution and in 2009, were the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij 
Resistance Force. 
6.2.1 The Revolutionary Guard and the Basij Resistance Force 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was established in 1979 to eliminate all 
opposition to the new Islamic state and to enforce Khomeini’s vision of the guardianship of the 
jurist. The Guards surpassed the conventional military and now act as the leading internal and 
external security force for the nation. The IRGC is the protector of the regime’s principles and is 
responsible for the security and stability of the regime. It has its own exclusive land, air, and sea 
forces and would be most likely to operate a nuclear weapon, if the regime had the capability.178  
But the IRGC power is not limited to control of the military forces—in 2009 it was 
estimated that the Guards controlled over 70 percent of Iran’s economy, ranging from medical 
clinics, factories, telecommunications companies, and construction firms. Additionally, in 2008 
and 2009, it received at least 6 billion dollars from Iran’s budget.179 The IRGC is also linked to 
hundreds of private companies that seem independent, but are actually headed by former IRGC 
members. Therefore, according to scholars like Cyrus Bina, since the election of Ahmadinejad in 
2005, the IRGC had inflicted a “para-militarization of the economy, polity, and social space in 
Iran.”180 
The paramilitary organization operating under the IRGC, the Basij Resistance Force, was 
created in 1980 to provide the Islamic Republic with a “people’s militia”. The Basij have 
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branches in almost every city in Iran and aid with law enforcement, internal security, and moral 
policing. During the Iran- Iraq War the Basij saw an increase in volunteers, numbering over 
100,000; however, by 2009 the IRGC Human Resources director reported there were 11.2 
million members in the organization.  Since the election of Ahmadinejad, a former member of 
the Basij, the organization had grown and became more involved in Iranian politics. The regime 
recruited the young and disillusioned, promoting the benefits of joining the organization and 
instilling the values of the revolution in its members. The branches of the organization include 
most mosques, government offices, public institutions and universities.181 However, because the 
Basij received less formal training than the Revolutionary Guards, there approach to opposition 
could be brutal, even dangerous. This was the case when the Basij were ordered to suppress the 
Green Movement protests in the summer of 2009. Both the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij 
played a crucial role in suppressing the demonstrations that followed the election.  
Months before the June elections, the Iranian government began to repress political 
opponents associated with the reform movement. In the spring of 2009, Amnesty International 
reported a drastic increase in “arbitrary arrests and harassment” in just one three month period.  
As the campaign progressed, the government realized the Green Movement was rapidly 
developing and it took preemptive measures to combat it. For instance, the Brigadier General of 
the Revolutionary Guard, Yadollah Javani said the use of the color green as a symbol of the 
reform movement was a “sure sign of the Velvet Revolution project”, but declared this type of 
movement “impossible in Iran.”182  Again, on the night before the election, he warned, “Any 
move toward Velvet Revolution will be nipped in the bud…the opposition, through heavy 
propaganda and a media-created atmosphere intend to thrill their supporters by early 
announcement of their victory, so that they will claim election fraud in case of their rival’s 
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victory”. Javani’s statement demonstrated that the regime anticipated mass frustration and anger 
if Mousavi did not become president—and it was more than prepared to suppress it.183  
Immediately after the election results were announced, hundreds of thousands of 
protestors swarmed the streets of Tehran. At first, the regime was slightly paralyzed by the seize 
of the demonstrations, but it quickly released more security forces—the Revolutionary Guards, 
Basij units, and forces known as Lebas Shakshi (regular clothed), who would blend into the 
crowd. The IRGC also used its weekly magazine, Sobhesadegh, to threaten to “destroy anyone 
who attempts to bring a velvet revolution”; a clear warning that Ahmadinejad’s government 
would not tolerate the reform movements.184 But hundreds of thousands continued to protest and 
in the first week thousands were beaten, hundreds were imprisoned, and dozens were murdered 
by snipers. On June 18th, Supreme Leader Khamenei gave a Friday prayer sermon in which he 
endorsed Ahmadinejad’s victory and blamed “opposition leaders and agitators” as the source of 
violence on the streets. He also gave the Iranian people an ultimatum—if protestors took 
continued to rush the streets, the regime would do whatever it took to suppress the 
demonstrations.185  But the Supreme Leader’s stern comments only encouraged more protestors 
to take to the streets in opposition.  
The next three days, the weekend of the 19th, 20th, and 21st, were the bloodiest days of the 
summer demonstrations.  The Revolutionary Guard and the Basij dispersed tear gas and fired 
directly into crowds of protestors while the Lebas Shaksi infiltrated the masses, beating and 
killing the opposition. They also followed demonstrators to their homes, breaking and entering to 
arrest or execute any opponents. The exact number of casualties is unknown; the government 
even prohibited hospitals from cataloging deaths that resulted from protests.  Additionally, every 
day the Basij mobilized thousands of more volunteers to combat the opposition.  
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As a result, even Iranians yelling “Allah Akbar” from their rooftops were in danger—the 
Basij patrolled neighborhoods, marked the apartments or houses with loud noises and returned in 
the morning to detain its residents.  Stories of thousands of opponents being detained, beaten, 
raped, and even killed in secret facilities all over the country, spread rapidly.  But the most 
significant incident that illustrated the regime’s violent tactics was the killing of Neda Soltani—
on June 20th the 26 year old student, who was not participating in the protests, was gunned down 
by a sniper on her way to a music lesson. Her death was filmed and was broadcasted 
worldwide—the gruesome killing became a unifying symbol of the uprising and the primary 
example of the Iranian regime’s onslaught against its own people.  For the next six months, the 
regime continued to use these methods, including violence, to suppress the Green Movement.  
But the strategies used to crush the opposition were not limited to military violence. Iran 
was one of the most technological savvy countries in the Middle East in 2009—the government 
Iranian government estimated there were 28 million internet users, more than 53 million cell 
phone users, and millions of households with satellite televisions in urban areas.186 Iran also had 
somewhere between 60,000 and 110,000 active blogs that discussed issues ranging from politics 
to environmental issues to sports. Therefore, the government spent millions to block the use of 
technology during the demonstrations.  Immediately after the election results were announced on 
June 12th, the state drastically decreased the internet speed to 56 KB. Additionally, all social 
networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, were completely shut down. Internet 
surveillance was greatly increased and the regime used ISP addresses to monitor, track, and 
arrest any Green Movement activists.  The regime also blocked Western satellite television 
channels and inhibited the sending of text messages. This approach, which one Revolutionary 
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Guard commander deemed “cyber jihad”, significantly impeded the Green Movement’s ability to 
organize and develop formidable opposition.187 
Because the Islamic regime learned the lesson of the overthrow of the Shah, it did not 
waver between repression and concession in dealing with the 2009 Green Movement protests. As 
Brigadier General Javani of the IRGC stated, “…no one is impartial. There are two currents—
those who defend and support the Revolution and the establishment and those who are trying to 
topple it.”188  Many prominent clerics and politicians, such as Ayatollahs Rafsanjani, Montazeri, 
and Karroubi criticized this approach and rebuked the violent manner in which protestors were 
handled. Despite their vocal objections, nothing was done to stop the violence.  Consequently, 
the military remained tightly united in support of the regime’s violent repressive tactics—one of 
the primary reasons the Green Movement was successfully suppressed.   
Political Science Professor Dariush Zahedi described the Islamic regime’s effective 
strategy against opposition in The Iranian Revolution: Then and Now in 2000. However, his 
depiction of the regime’s tactics correctly portrays the method of oppression in 2009 as well. He 
explains: 
“…In the post Khomeini era, Iran’s rulers have continued the pattern (set during 
Khomeini’s supervision of the Islamic system) of not allowing internal divisions 
to hamstring them in contending with external challenges to their collective 
rule…from 1990 to 1995 seven major spontaneous urban uprisings rocked Iran. 
The regime’s response to all disturbances, supported unanimously by all the 
competing factions and personalities, was consistently swift, overwhelming, and 
ruthless repression. In sharp contrast to the Shah, the Islamic system has not 
responded to disturbances with trepidation and half measures. Instead, it has 
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created and made effective use of special antiriot forces, which are adept at 
rapidly suppressing uprisings in order to prevent them from spreading.”189   
Supreme Leader Khamenei reiterated this position in August 2009, when he said, "The 
enemies must know that the protests, which are caricature of the pre-revolutionary ones, cannot 
undermine the system”.  No matter how similar the Green Movement protests were to the 1979 
revolution, the Islamic regime was determined to suppress the movement and was willing to do 
anything to protect the stability of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
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7.0  CONCLUSION 
In the weeks following the election of President Ahmadinejad in June 2009, Iranian voices 
yelling “Allah Akbar” and “Down to the Dictator” reverberated from the rooftops with 
revolutionary phrases that had not been used in almost thirty years. The opposition to the Islamic 
government, the Green Movement, was not simply the largest opposition movement since the 
Islamic Revolution, but it was mimicking the tactics used 30 years ago that had forced the 
overthrow of the Shah. This specific type of widespread civil disobedience, coupled with the 
mass demonstrations taking place on the street, signaled that the Iranian people were ready to 
challenge the government.  
Not only were the Green Movement’s tactics similar to those used in the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution, but the opposition also experienced some of the same conditions that fostered the 
overthrow of the Shah.  For instance, the vast majority of Iranians were worse off in 2009, 
economically speaking, after 30 years of Islamic rule than they had been during the Shah’s era. 
Income inequality, high inflation, extensive government corruption, and unemployment had not 
been eliminated—oil revenue acted as the sole pillar of the Islamic regime’s economy and the 
people’s frustrations became palpable.  Additionally, political repression and violence against the 
opposition became even more prominent in post revolutionary Iran.  During the Shah’s reign, 
political life was restricted, but in the first decade of the 21st century political, social, and cultural 
restraints had inhibited everyday activities. Therefore, in 2009, just as in 1979 there were 
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legitimate political and economic grievances that had the potential to create a successful 
opposition movement. With these factors present, why did the existing regime prevail? Why did 
the Green Movement, which had up to 3 million protestors have no direct impact on the 
governing system? After comparing the Green Movement with the Islamic Revolution, the two 
most significant factors that impeded the 2009 opposition were the unwavering repressive 
strategies used by the Iranian military and the weakness of the opposition movement.  
During the Islamic Revolution the opposition included a diverse array of social, 
economic, and political strata from Iranian society. Furthermore, the movement had a 
charismatic leader and a common goal that temporarily united all the opposition groups. The 
overthrow of the Shah occurred due to the strength of the opposition movement and the fact that 
the military was divided and was unable to use force to keep the regime in power. In 2009; 
however, every branch of the security apparatus—the Revolutionary Guard, the Basij, the regular 
army, and even volunteer Lebas Shaksi (plain clothed, undercover forces)—remained extremely 
loyal to the regime and its orders to use violence against dissenters. The Green Movement was 
also decentralized, had no cohesive leadership or platform, and had no means (once the internet 
was shut down) to reach the Iranian public—all characteristics that inhibited the movement from 
mobilizing resources and enacting tangible change.  
Accordingly, the Green Movement was forced underground for most of 2010, developing 
through social media networks and private meetings. Although no more large protests occurred 
after February 11, 2010 the opposition still tormented the regime with smaller acts of defiance—
writing anti-government slogans on Iranian money and buildings. But then, in January of 2011 
the Green Movement reemerged in response to mass demonstrations taking place in Tunisia and 
Egypt. Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators took the streets just as they did in the summer of 
  115 
2009 and were met with the same violent response. Demonstrations continued into late March, 
but the regime quickly suppressed the opposition—calling for the execution of Green Movement 
leaders, imprisoning members, and putting Mousavi and Karroubi under house arrest 
immediately. The regime feared that even a limited amount of reform, would develop into a 
demand for massive political change—and its fear was not unfounded—as the opposition, 
leaders of the Islamic Republic themselves benefited from the Shah’s periodic liberal reforms. 
The regime would not give the Green Movement or any reform organization the same 
opportunity the Shah gave the revolutionary opposition. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran demonstrated in the summer of 2009 it was willing to do 
anything in its power to maintain political stability. Although the mass and violent oppression of 
its own people preserved the establishment temporarily, the regime lost two essential 
characteristics of governance—legitimacy and authority. Yes, opponents of the regime have been 
questioning these aspects of Islamic Republic since its inception, but the government actually 
alienated some of its own supporters—traditionally loyal clerics and politicians expressed 
extreme disappointment and anger with the government’s actions. The disagreements between 
governing factions specifically the clerical elites, has significantly weakened the regime’s power 
and has raised questions about its future stability.  
 Although the Green Movement has not accomplished any apparent political change, it 
has had a profound and long-lasting impact on the Iranian regime. There are millions of Iranians 
who support progressive reform, but they have no political representation. There is a vast desire 
for political, social, and cultural change—but it seems impossible to reach and organize Iranians 
willing to back liberal reform. Fear of government punishment inhibits political activism, but the 
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Green Movement can offer Iranians an outlet for information, discussion, and even action. The 
movement is engaging and creating a group of politically aware and active Iranian citizens.  
Consequently, the Green Movement is true to its name—it is a movement, not a 
revolution. It has not been completely obliterated by the brutal tactics of the Iranian regime, but 
also has not transformed Iran in to the idyllic model of democracy overnight. Although many 
were disappointed with the lack of tangible results, the Green Movement is still developing and 
is actively organizing reform strategies. In fact, a slowly developed movement that can create a 
bona fide program for change has more long term potential than a short term insurrectionary 
movement that results in ineffective reforms. Also, comparatively, the primary cause of the 
Islamic Revolution was a reaction to the overwhelming pressures that had built up over decades 
of frustration. A handful of opposition attempts, like Mossadegh’s liberalization attempts and the 
1963 uprisings against the White Revolution, developed and were repressed by the Shah before 
any political change occurred.  Over the more than 30 years since the Islamic Revolution, the 
scale and scope of social and political support for the regime has continued to drop, it is simply a 
matter of time before the pressure causes a transfer of power.  
However, Iranians who lived through the Islamic Revolution have not forgotten about the 
1979 outcome—the capture by the Islamic extremists of the political movement, which had 
originally been democratic in nature. Iranians who support democratic reforms are eager to rid 
themselves of an autocratic government, but they realize that true regime change takes time and 
are willing to wait for an opportunity to accomplish authentic governmental reforms.  
Furthermore, the leaders of the Iranian democratic movement, such as Ebrahim Yazdi, the 
founder of the secular Freedom Movement Party are confident regime change will occur 
eventually. For instance, in 1997 Yazdi said confidently, “Democracy will eventually win in 
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Iran. They [the regime] must recognize this fact”, and he still stands by that statement (Peterson). 
Even Islamic clerics recognized the impact the Green Movement had on the stability of the 
country. Shortly before his death in December 2009, the key revolutionary leader Ayatollah 
Hossein-Ali Montazeri made an unforgettable prediction about the Green Movement. He 
commented: “In the end the state will have no choice but to capitulate to the Green 
Movement.”190 As the Green Movement continues to develop into a well organized social 
movement and the Islamic regime’s legitimacy perpetually declines, the government will have 
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